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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
Fifth Circuit   
 
Guilbeau v. Hess Corp., 854 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 
Landowner purchased property on which—more than three decades 
earlier—Operator had conducted oil and gas operations. Operator had 
plugged and abandoned its wells in 1973 after its oil and gas leases expired. 
Landowner sued Operator, alleging damages based on contamination from 
the on-tract drilling activities. Operator moved for summary judgment. 
Applying Louisiana law, the district court granted Operator’s motion, 
reasoning that the subsequent-purchaser rule barred Landowner’s claims. 
Landowner appealed and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In 
Louisiana, the subsequent-purchaser rule provides that a landowner may not 
recover from a third party for damage inflicted on a tract before 
landowner’s purchase unless a predecessor assigned such right to the 
landowner—in other words, it is a personal right. And though the Louisiana 
Supreme Court had not addressed the question, decisions from the state 
courts of appeals revealed a “consensus supporting the application of the 
subsequent purchaser doctrine to cases involving mineral leases.” Citing 
these decisions, the court held that the subsequent-purchaser rule barred 
Landowner’s claims against Operator. 
 
T D X Energy, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 857 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 
2017). 
 
Unit Operator (“Operator”) force pooled a unit with several lease owners to 
effectively develop the area. One Unit Lessee (“Lessee”) acquired its leases 
from the mineral owners after Operator spudded the well, but prior to 
completion. Lessee requested an accounting, which Operator failed to send, 
while Operator requested Lessee pay its share of drilling costs and risk 
charge associated with operations. State statute required that Operator send 
all unleased interest holders an accounting upon request. Operator 
contended that Lessee did not meet this definition, while Lessee contends 
that because its lease occurred after Operator began spudding the well, the 
statue applied to Lessee. Because Operator failed to send timely reports 
pursuant to state statute, it forfeited its rights to collect contribution of 
drilling costs from Lessee. Operator additionally alleged that state statute 
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required Lessee to pay a risk charge on the well. However, the statute 
required Operator to send notice of drilling prior to commencement of 
drilling to be able to collect a risk charge. Because of Operator’s untimely 
notice, Lessee owes neither drilling costs nor a risk charge to Operator.  
 
Sixth Circuit  
 
Atlas Noble, LLC v. Krizman Enters., No. 15–4385, 2017 WL 2260988 (6th 
Cir. May 23, 2017). 
 
Buyer executed a purchase and sale agreement (“PSA”) with Seller 
respecting certain oil and gas leases. On closing day, Buyer notified Seller 
via email that Buyer was unilaterally terminating the agreement, alleging 
that Seller had not cleared title on a sufficient percentage of the subject 
acreage. After receiving Buyer’s email, Seller took no further action on the 
PSA and refused to release certain escrowed funds. Buyer sued Seller, 
arguing that Seller breached by refusing to authorize the release of 
escrowed funds to Buyer per a provision of the PSA. Seller counterclaimed 
that it was entitled to the funds, arguing that Buyer had breached. The 
district court granted summary judgment for Seller, reasoning that Buyer 
anticipatorily breached with its closing-date email. But the district court 
denied Seller’s request for damages amounting to the PSA’s total value, 
reasoning that the parties intended the escrow account to act as a liquidated 
damages clause. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and 
affirmed in part. First, the court reversed the district court’s conclusion that 
Buyer anticipatorily breached because at least some evidence suggested that 
Seller could not have completed the transaction on time—in other words, 
fact issues remained and precluded summary judgment. Second, the court 
affirmed the liquidated damages ruling because: (1) the escrow percentage 
was not unreasonably large relative to the PSA’s value and (2) liquidated 
damages in a PSA for oil and gas leases are reasonable given the regular 




Hill v. Sw. Energy Co., 858 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 
Landowners sued Producers engaged in hydraulic fracturing operations, 
alleging that Producer’s fracking waste disposed near Landowners’ 
property migrated into the subsurface after refusing to lease property to 
Producer. Landowners asserted theories of trespass and unjust enrichment. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
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The trial court granted Producer’s summary judgment motion at the end of 
the first discovery phase on the issue of whether the waste fluid migrated to 
the subsurface strata of Landowners’ property. Although the evidence 
gathered at the end of this discovery phase on the issue of subsurface 
migration “seems likely,” trial court granted Producer’s motion because it 
concluded that a reasonable juror would have to speculate to conclude that a 
trespass by migration actually occurred. Landowners appealed. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the expert report estimating how far 
injected fracking waste had spread was admissible in Landowners’ lawsuit. 
Additionally, an issue of material fact existed as to whether there were 
sealing formations in the property’s subsurface that would otherwise 
prevent Producer’s fracking waste from migrating. Given this, the court 
reversed and remanded the case.  
 
Tenth Circuit  
 
Fletcher v. United States, 854 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 
A certified class of Osage tribal members in Oklahoma brought a class 
action suit against the federal government, claiming a mismanagement of 
the oil ad gas royalty funds that the federal government was to hold in trust 
for the Osage people. The Osage members were seeking an accounting, 
which the trial court granted on a limited basis. The Osage members 
appealed, claiming that they had the right to receive an accounting of funds 
since 1906 and that they should receive a full audit of the funds since that 
time. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision, citing one 
major reason for limiting the audit as the funds in question were not worth 
very much. About $15 per member of the class per year. For this reason, the 
appellate court agreed with the 2002 starting point for the audit and the 
limited information that was required to be provided. 
 
D. Wyoming  
 
Kaiser–Francis Oil Co. v. Noble Casing Inc., No. 2:16–CV–00309, 2017 
WL 1947506 (D. Wyo. May 10, 2017). 
 
Operator sued Casing Company—who supplied casing crews and power 
casing tongs at Operator’s wellsite—for negligence and breach of contract 
after Operator detected a leak in the casing of its well during a hydraulic 
fracturing operation. Operator alleged that such leak caused all fracturing 
operations to cease and that Operator incurred damages exceeding $1.5 
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million. Casing Company counterclaimed that Operator assumed all 
liability for Casing Company and agreed to defend and hold harmless 
Casing Company under the parties’ Master Service Agreement (“MSA”). 
Operator moved to dismiss, arguing that the indemnitee provision was void 
as against public policy based on a Wyoming statute that prohibited all 
agreements “pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water” that purport “to 
relieve the indemnitee from loss or liability for his own negligence.” The 
district court concluded that MSA’s indemnitee provision was void and 
unenforceable to the extent it indemnified Casing Company for its own 
direct conduct because the activities that led to Operator’s claims were 
“closely related to oil well drilling.” Moreover, to construe MSA as 
requiring Operator to defend Casing Company would render certain 
provisions of MSA meaningless. Thus, the court granted Operator’s motion 
to dismiss Casing Company’s counterclaim and denied Casing Company’s 




Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Park Serv., Case No: 2:16-cv-585-FtM-
99CM, 2017 WL 1438238 (M.D. Fla. April 24, 2017).  
 
Mineral Interest Owners (“MIOs”) owned interest found within a national 
park. MIOs hired an E&P Company to conduct seismic on some land above 
the mineral interest. In accordance with federal law, E&P Company filed an 
application to the National Park Service (“NPS”) to conduct seismic on 
over 400 square miles of the total mineral interest within the national park, 
but later changed it to 110 square miles. After much back and forth, two 
unrequired notice and comment periods and conferencing with the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) about both the environmental assessment (“EA”) 
and biological assessment (“BA”), the final plan was approved, a Finding 
of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) was issued and forty-seven mitigation 
measures were implemented. Environmental Groups sued NPS and others 
for declaratory and both temporary and permanent injunctive relief under 
the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). 
Environmental Groups had eight claims against NPS arising from NEPA, 
APA, and ESA requirements for failure to: (1) prepare an environmental 
impact statement, (2) take a “hard look” at the effectiveness of the 
mitigation measures, (3) to take a “hard look” at the adverse impacts caused 
by conducting seismic, (4) consider all reasonable alternatives, (5) obtain 
technologically feasible alternatives, their costs and environmental impact, 
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(6) follow consultation requirements with E&P Company throughout the 
process, (7) reinitiate consultation after changes in the plan and (8) 
reinitiate consultation on the Preserve Management Plans as a new 
endangered species had been added to the list since last consolation. 
Ultimately the district court found that NPS did follow the requirements 
under NEPA, APA, and ESA as required and denied both the declaratory 
and injunctive relief. Environmental Groups have since appealed, but there 
is no decision from the higher court. 
 
N.D. Illinois  
 
Buchanan Energy (N), LLC v. Lake Bluff Holdings, LLC, No. 15 CV 3851, 
2017 WL 1232973 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2017). 
 
Two energy companies entered into a lease agreement which contained an 
option to purchase the leased premises during the term of the lease. The 
purchase price was to be the average of three appraisal values done on the 
premises. The valuations of the land were vastly different. The purchasing 
company’s appraiser valued the land at $295,000, the mutually agreed 
appraiser valued the land at $493,100, and the selling company’s appraiser 
valued the land at $695,000. Both the purchasing company and the selling 
company sought to have the other’s appraisal voided. The court ruled that, 
because the average of two appraisals that were done by the companies 
averaged very closely to the mutual appraisal, the court could not equitably 
strike one or the other, allowing a windfall to the other party. Thus the court 
denied the motions to exclude the expert’s evaluation. 
 
N.D. West Virginia  
 
Bison Res. Corp. v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:16CV107, 2017 WL 1164500 
(N.D. W.Va. 2017). 
 
A resources corporation (“Corporation A”) purchased from another 
resources corporation (“Corporation B”) oil and gas leases that Corporation 
B owned. In those leases was a right of first refusal to drill, which 
Corporation B acquired through the acquisition of a third company that held 
the right of first refusal. Corporation A, without giving notice to 
Corporation B, began drilling and producing natural gas from the leases on 
which Corporation B held the right of first refusal. Corporation B brought 
suit and the Corporation A filed a motion for summary judgment. 
Corporation A argued that the right of first refusal that Corporation B held 
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was invalidated under two different theories. The first was that the right of 
first refusal was nontransferable and thus, when Corporation B received the 
rights, they expired. The court dismissed this claim as Corporation B did 
not purchase the rights, but rather, purchased the third company that held 
them. This was not a transfer but an assumption, so the rights were still 
valid. The second argument was that the rights of first refusal should be 
barred by the rule against perpetuities as the right had not been used within 
twenty-one years and ten months or a life in being at the time of transfer. 
The court dismissed this defense as the right of first refusal is not a property 
conveyance and thus not affected by the rule against perpetuities. 
Corporation A’s motion for summary judgment was denied. 
 
Reynolds v. Ascent Res. - Marcellus, LLC, No. 1:16CV77, 2017 WL 
1959220 (N.D. W.Va. May 11, 2017). 
 
An oil and gas company (“Company”) leased Landowner’s mineral interest. 
Following lease execution, Company found from the state regulatory 
agency that production already existed on the property, and so the land was 
already subject to an oil and gas lease. Company issued a bonus check to 
Landowner less the amount of the land subject to the lease already in 
existence, which Landowner deposited. Company then partially released 
Landowner’s interest and did not pay the additional bonus amount, for 
which Landowner sued for breach of contract. The lease contained a 
general warranty of title, and Company argued that this exempted its 
requirements under the lease, because the Landowners warranty failed. 
Landowner countered that the remaining interest could still be produced, 
despite the other lease. Genuine issue of fact remains as to the status of title 
at the time Company and Landowner executed the lease, and so the court 
denied the parties’ mutual motions for summary judgment.  
 
W.D. Oklahoma   
 
McKnight v. Marathon Oil Co., No. CIV-17-00264-R, 2017 WL 1628981 
(W.D. Okla. May 1, 2017).  
 
Lessors sued Lessee after learning that Lessee allegedly passed the cost of 
making any unprocessed natural gas marketable to Lessors. Lessors sued 
under theories of (1) breach of contract, (2) accounting, (3) fraud, (4) unjust 
enrichment and (5) breach of state law regarding revenue standards. Lessee 
removed case to federal court claiming diversity jurisdiction and then 
moved to dismiss the fraud and unjust enrichment claims. The trial court 
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approved Lessee’s motion based on several findings. First, Lessors failed to 
allege an “indispensable element” of a fraud claim—detrimental reliance. 
Second, Lessors failed to allege specific damages caused by Lessee’s fraud 
rather than breach of contract, violating the general rule that “a claim for 
fraud must be distinct from a claim for breach of contract.” Third, Lessors 
incorporating all allegations in the complaint—including breach of oil and 
gas leases—in addition seeking an equitable remedy because Lessee 
allegedly benefitted from Lessors’ expense and detriment, violated a long-
standing state rule that plaintiffs may not pursue an equitable remedy when 
an adequate remedy at law is available. The court approved Lessee’s 
motion to dismiss.  
 




Panhandle Oil & Gas, Inc. v. BHP Billiton Petroleum Fayetteville, LLC, 
2017 Ark. App. 201, No. CV-16-884, 2017 WL 1277422. 
 
Working Interest Owner (“WIO”) sued Operator for its failure to send well 
proposals and failure to properly account for production. The lower court 
dismissed all of WIO’s arguments for failure to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted. WIO appealed arguing that the court improperly 
dismissed these claims as WIO met the burden under state law to state a 
claim. State law only required that WIO plead that a valid, enforceable 
contract existed and that WIO demonstrate facts sufficient to show a claim 
of unjust enrichment. WIO produced two contracts executed by Operator’s 
predecessor-in-interest, which met the low burden to establish a validly 
executed contract. WIO also provided sufficient well data to meet the 
minimum requirement for factual evidence for an unjust enrichment claim. 
However, WIO’s claim for an accounting only constituted a remedy and not 
a cause of action. The appellate court remanded the contract and unjust 




Moore v. Chevron USA, 2016-0805 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/25/17); NO. 2016 
CA 0805, 2017 WL 2303318. 
 
Landowner purchased land from an oil and gas company (“Company”). 
Shortly after, Landowner noticed environmental damage. Landowner took 
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some informal steps to cure the harm then, but did not file any legal 
proceedings against Company to remedy the environmental defects 
Landowner had found. Several years later Landowner sued to compel 
Company to remedy the issues with the property. Company claimed that 
this was no longer its responsibility to fix as Landowner waited beyond the 
statutory year long period to demand remedy of the defect. Landowner 
claimed that the yearlong limitation had not yet started tolling as he did not 
have sufficient information about the defect to begin the tolling of the year-
long clock. Company counter-claimed that the clock had begun running 
when Landowner first brought the informal proceedings to remedy the 
defects. The court agreed, ruling in favor of Company, leaving Landowner 
with the cost of the defect, court costs, and attorney fees. 
 
Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Oleum Operating Co., 2016-429 (La. App. 3 
Cir. 3/8/17); No. 2016-429, 2017 WL 914767. 
 
Oilfield Owner (“Owner”) sued Operator, Operator’s Successor-in-Interest 
(“Successor”), and Operator’s Predecessor-in-Interest (“Predecessor”) for 
environmental damages to the property and failure to abide by lease 
remediation provisions. The lower court found Predecessor responsible for 
the damage and required Predecessor submit a remediation plan to the state 
environmental agency. On appeal by Owner, the court found that Operator 
violated express lease requirements that gave Operator a six-month window 
to begin its remediation plans, which Operator failed to do. In addition, the 
court found that Operator’s council violated a motion in limine which 
prohibited any discussion of attempts to remediate very close to trial to 
protect the integrity of the jury. In addition to these damages, Successor 
allowed the old lease to lapse and signed a new lease which contained 
express clean-up provisions, with which Successor failed to comply. The 
parties all greatly contested the costs of a potential cleanup, therefore the 
court remanded in order to properly assess the dollar figure required in 
order to sufficiently comply with the lease remediation provisions. 
 
North Dakota  
 
Black Stone Minerals Co. v. Brokaw, 2017 ND 140, 893 N.W.2d 498. 
 
Rival mineral interest owners, a Mineral Company and a Predecessor’s 
Heirs (“Heirs”), disputed ownership of the minerals under a tract based on a 
district court judgment and successive conveyances overtime. Mineral 
Company’s successors initiated a quiet title against Heirs to determine the 
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proper ownership of the mineral interest based on the earlier judgment. The 
judgment conveyed title to Heirs predecessors in fee simple, but failed to 
specify the percentage of interest. Mineral Company contended that the 
judgment vested the entire interest in one of Heirs’ predecessors. The North 
Dakota Supreme Court held that, per state statute, and property interest that 
vested between numerous people vested as tenants in common. Thus, when 
one of the Heirs’ predecessors conveyed his whole undivided interest to 
Mineral Company, this only conveyed one-half the mineral interest. 
Mineral Company then claimed to have adversely possessed the other one-
half, but the court found that adverse possession time period could only 
begin for minerals when Mineral Company produced the minerals, which 
had not reached the appropriate number of years. Company also included 
challenges for laches and good-faith purchaser defenses, but the court 
rejected these because these are affirmative defenses under state law and 
cannot be used as Mineral Company sought to use them. Finally, Mineral 
Company challenged the district court’s refusal to correct the judgment. 
The district court may only correct its judgments, but not make substantial 
changes to the law of the judgment, as Mineral Company sought it to do. 
The court found that Mineral Company’s successor in interest to be record 
title owners to half of the mineral interest, and Heirs to be record title 
owners to the other half. With this decision, the court affirmed in part and 
reversed in part the lower courts decisions and remanded the case.  
 
Ogren v. Sandaker, 2017 ND 105, 893 N.W. 2d 750. 
 
Conveyees of a royalty interest in land brought quiet title action on the 
royalty interests arguing the original assignment conveyed “fractional 
royalty interest”. The trial court granted summary judgment finding that the 
nearly sixty-year-old royalty assignment conveyed a fraction of the royalty 
interest. Conveyees appealed trial court decision. The North Dakota 
Supreme Court held that the royalty assignment unambiguously conveyed a 
“fraction of royalty” and not a “fractional royalty” to the Royalty Interest 
Owner’s seven siblings (“Conveyees”). The court reasoned that although 
the conveying language was like examples of language that conveyed a 
fractional royalty, here, the deed had to be examined as a whole. The 
language in the deed’s assignment’s intent clause instructed that 
computation of the royalty interest be so that each conveyee receive an 
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THR Minerals, LLC v. Robinson, 2017 ND 78, 892 N.W.2d 193. 
 
An oil and gas royalty assignee (“Assignee”) sued Assignor to quiet title to 
mineral royalty ownership in certain property. The dispute surrounded 
interpretation of a 1942 royalty assignment from Assignor’s predecessor to 
Assignee’s predecessor. Assignor’s predecessor owned a one-third interest 
in the relevant property. Even so, Assignee argued it was entitled to 6.25 
percent (%) of the royalty in the entire property, not just the predecessor’s 
one-third share. Ultimately, the trial court agreed with Assignee, granting 
summary judgment in Assignee’s favor. Assignor appealed, and the North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. The court highlighted the assignment’s 
pertinent language: The predecessor granted “all our right [to 6.25 % 
royalty of the oil and gas] produced and saved from the hereinafter 
described lands.” Assignor seized on the assignment’s use of the word 
“our,” reasoning that the predecessor could not grant more interest than it 
actually owned. Assignor thus argued that the trial court’s ruling amounted 
to a windfall for Assignee. But Assignee—and ultimately the court—argued 
that although “our” showed possession of something, it did not demonstrate 
how the royalty interest was to be calculated. In siding with the trial court, 
the court held that the assignment’s language immediately following the 
6.25 % royalty defined “how the . . . royalty was to be calculated” and 
unambiguously showed the predecessor’s intent to grant Assignee a 
percentage royalty based on minerals produced “from the entire tract of 




Greer v. Frye, NO. 14 BE 0032, 2017 WL 2333722 (Ohio Ct. App. May 
30, 2017).  
 
Original Owners owned both mineral and surface interest, and retained a 
portion of the mineral interest when they conveyed both the remainder of 
the mineral interest and full surface interest to a third party. Through a 
series of conveyance from third party to another, Landowners claimed both 
surface interest and mineral interest. Mineral Interest Owners (“MIOs”) 
claimed their mineral interest as heirs of Original Owners. Landowners 
published a Notice of Abandonment in January 2011, in the local 
newspaper to try and rejoin all outstanding mineral interest to the surface 
interest. MIOs filed an Affidavit to Preserve Mineral Interest within sixty 
days of the Notice of Abandonment to preserve their interests. Two years 
later, Landowners filed a quiet title action under the 1989 Ohio Dormant 
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Mineral Act (“1998 ODMA”). MIOs answered and requested the action be 
viewed under the 2006 Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (“2006 ODMA”). The 
trial court found for Landowner in a summary judgment decision under the 
1989 ODMA saying that MIOs did not act to preserve their interest within 
the 20-year requirement. MIOs appealed on two issues: (1) the trial court 
should have not used the 1989 ODMA, but the 2006 ODMA and (2) MIOs 
are the rightful owners under the 2006 ODMA. The appellate court found 
for MIOs, reversed the trial court’s decision, and granted summary 
judgment in favor of MIOs. The court held: (1) the 2006 ODMA did apply 
based on case law saying it applied to all claims asserted after 2006 and (2) 
MIOs timely filed their claim to preserve under the 2006 ODMA and are 
therefore the rightful owners.  
 
Harmon v. Capstone Holding Co., CASE NO. 14 NO 0413, 2017 WL 
2438560 (Ohio Ct. App. June 5, 2017).  
 
Original Owner of the property severed the mineral and surface estate by 
conveying the surface estate to a third party and retaining the full mineral 
estate in the deed. Current Landowners came to own the surface estate 
through several conveyances. Original Owner also later conveyed the 
mineral estate to the current Mineral Interest Owner (“MIO”). In 2008, 
Landowners notified Original Owner of intent to declare the mineral 
interest abandoned and received no response, so they filed an affidavit of 
abandonment. Four years later, MIO filed an affidavit to preserve its 
interest, yet had never been notified by Landowner of affidavit of 
abandonment. A year later Landowner filed a quiet title action, which the 
trial court held Landowner did not own the mineral interest under either the 
1989 and 2006 Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (“ODMA”). The trial court held 
that under the 1989 ODMA it would be Landowners’ predecessor in 
interest that owned the mineral estate, and under the 2006 ODMA it was the 
MIO because it was never provided record notice of intent to abandon. 
Landowners appealed and the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment holding that the 2006 ODMA applied and that given lack of 









Stephens Prod. Co., a Div. of SF Holding Corp. v. Larsen, 2017 OK 36, 
394 P.3d 1262. 
 
Production Company filed to exercise eminent domain for underground 
natural gas storage easements and surface easements. More than 140 
landowners challenged the petition for eminent domain, but eventually, all 
but one Landowner in this case settled. This Landowner continued the 
litigation and claimed that the amount offered to him was well below what 
his land was worth. Production Company argued that it followed the broad 
rules of eminent domain by finding a reasonable fair market value at a price 
it could have been sold “by a person desirous of selling to a person wishing 
to buy.” The lower courts found that the amount given to Landowner was 
calculated using general condemnation principles and found in favor of 
Production Company. Because the state does not permit special pricing due 
to boom or fancy values, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial 





EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jeffeson Hills, No. 1184 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 
2180678 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 18, 2017). 
 
Town appealed court order that reversed the decision of the Town Council 
(“Council”) denying the conditional use application of Producers to 
construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas production facility on an area 
of its property. Council supported its position with Producers’ alleged 
failure to satisfy a town Zoning Ordinance, which states: “The use shall not 
endanger the public health, safety or welfare nor deteriorate the 
environment, as a result of being located on the property where it is 
proposed.” On review, appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision 
holding that Council erred when it concluded that the conditional use would 
constitute a detriment to the public health, safety, and welfare exceeding 
that ordinarily to be expected from the proposed use. The court also held 
that Town’s evidence does not constitute the required substantial evidence 




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
584 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
Murphy v. Karnek, 160 A.3d 850 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).  
 
Heirs brought a quiet title action for a declaratory judgment regarding 
ownership of oil and gas rights in a parcel of land once owned by 
Landowner who died intestate. A family partnership formed by the widow 
of one of Landowners’ sons and widow’s son opposed the Heirs’ quiet title 
action. Trial court had granted summary judgment, and ordered distribution 
of rents and royalties according to each party’s share. All parties appealed. 
The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court correctly concluded 
that until Landowner’s death, Landowner’s widow had a life estate and 
Landowner held the remainder interest in the oil and gas in the parcel in 
dispute. State superior court held that Landowner’s deed that conveyed a 
land parcel but excepted and reserved all the parcel’s oil and gas 
unambiguously said that the conveyance was made subject to a previous 
deed “by which conveyance all the oil and gas rights were conveyed to” 
grandmother, did not change or convey the grandmother’s life estate in the 
oil and gas of which the grandfather held the remainder interest. Had a right 
existed at the time of the conveyance, the deed’s language treated this as an 
exception, and grandmother’s life estate existed before the deed in question. 
However, because no right existed at the time of conveyance, Landowners’ 
deed from approximately eighty years prior in which the conveyed land 
parcel did not change. Further, grandmother’s will conveyed to specified 
daughter the one-third remainder interest in the oil and gas that 
grandmother had inherited upon grandfather’s death. The rationale was the 
description of the specific lot did not reduce the general devise, and it was 
in harmony with grandmother’s general intent to give daughter income and 
a place to live to care for the other daughter.  
 
Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Utility Comm’n, 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2017). 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, a “stripper well”—unlike a “vertical gas well”—
does not pay certain environmental impact fees. In this case, the state 
enforcement bureau filed a complaint alleging that a gas producer 
(“Producer”) failed to pay impact fees on its wells. The state Public Utility 
Commission (“PUC”), relying in part on an ALJ’s recommendation, 
concluded that a gas well is a “stripper well” only if its incapable of 
producing 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during every month of the year. 
Producer appealed, arguing that the relevant statutory language— “during 
any calendar month”—meant any one month of the year, not all months. 
The court agreed with Producer, concluding that because a calendar year 
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consists of twelve individual months, the most natural construction of “any” 
meant at least “one” month of the year, no matter which one. The court 
noted that to apply PUC’s construction of the word would “engraft non-
existent verbiage” into the statute. Producer’s wells were “stripper wells” 
because they produced less than 90,000 cubic feet of gas in at least one 
month. And the court noted that even if the word “any” was truly 
ambiguous, the rule of lenity would apply to resolve the ambiguity in 
Producer’s favor. Thus, the court reversed PUC’s imposition of interest and 




Davis v. Mueller, No. 16–0155, 2017 WL 2299316 (Tex. May 26, 2017). 
 
An out-of-state resident conveyed to Landowner her mineral interest in ten 
“vaguely described” tracts in the County. The deed contained a Mother 
Hubbard clause and a general granting clause, the latter of which stated that 
Landowner was to receive “all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding 
royalty interest owned by [grantor in the] County.” At the same time, 
another out-of-state resident conveyed separate interests in the County to 
Landowner using an identical deed. Two decades later, the out-of-state 
residents independently deeded these interests to Claimant, who sued 
Landowner to quiet title in the mineral interests. The trial court granted 
Landowner’s motion for summary judgment without stating the grounds. 
The court of appeals reversed, agreeing with Claimant that the deed’s 
general granting clause was ambiguous. The Texas Supreme Court reversed 
and rendered judgment for Landowner. The court noted that unlike the deed 
at issue in an earlier case—J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer—the general 
grant in this case actually resolved an ambiguity. Moreover, curing the 
deficiencies of the deed’s specific grants was “precisely the purpose” of the 
general grant language. The court reasoned that the general grant’s 
conveyance “could not be clearer.” And because the conveyances to 
Landowner preceded those to Claimant, Landowner had superior title.   
 
Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, No. 15-0919, 2017 WL 
2200343 (Tex. May 19, 2017).  
 
Operator A owned an oil and gas lease for the mineral estate separated from 
but lying under Ranch’s surface estate, and had three current producing 
wells located on Ranch’s surface estate. Operator B leased the mineral 
estate adjacent to Operator A from State, but the lease did not allow 
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Operator B to use State’s surface estate for drilling. Operator B contracted 
with Ranch to use its surface estate to drill horizontal wells into Operator 
B’s mineral estate. Operator A sued for trespass and tortious interference 
arguing that Operator B needed Operator A’s consent as it owned the 
mineral estate not Ranch’s consent as it only owned the surface estate. Both 
Operators moved for summary judgment on the issue, and the trial court 
granted for Operator B. Operator A appealed, and the appellate court 
affirmed the trial court holding that Operator B only owned the minerals 
within the mineral estate, not the subterranean structures holding the 
molecules. Operator A appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas which 
affirmed the lower courts holding that: (1) Operator B’s rights are not 
greater than that of Ranch’s rights, and thus they fall within the 
accommodation doctrine, (2) that any loss of minerals Operator A will 
suffer is not sufficient to support trespass claims as it will be limited to only 
what is brought up through the drilling process, (3) that allowing Operator 
A as mineral estate owner to prevent subsurface and surface use of the land 
would greatly alter the accommodation doctrine and (4) the drilling plans of 
Operator B did not amount to tortious interference with Operator A’s 
operations.  
 
Norhill Energy LLC v. McDaniel, 517 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. App. 2017).  
 
Lessee had taken a lease with a 2-year primary term from Lessor that 
allowed the primary term to be extended if there were “drilling or 
reworking operations” conducted “in good faith.” Towards the end of the 
primary term, Lessee had drilled six non-producing wells, and was planning 
on drilling a seventh, but Lessor convinced Lessee to try and use a 
submersible pump to remedy the water production, saying he would 
consider it “reworking” under the lease. Lessee installed the pump, but no 
oil was produced. One month after the original expiration date of the lease, 
which was still held by the “reworking” operation of the pump, Lessor and 
Lessee executed a new agreement that that Lessee would assign the lease 
back to Lessor for $50,000 within thirty days of executing the agreement. 
Lessee waited several months, but never received the $50,000 and when 
Lessee met with Lessor, Lessor made a statement to the point of he was 
trying to get out of the agreement. Lessee sued Lessor for breach of 
contract, fraud, money had and received, and promissory estoppel. The jury 
found for Lessee on all but the fraud account, but granted Lessee damages 
of $50,000 only on the money had and received account. Both parties 
motioned for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court 
granted in favor of the Lessor such that Lessee received no damages. 
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Lessee appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the jury verdict, holding 
Lessee should receive the $50,000 on the money had and received account 
but not on the breach of contract claim.   
 
Permian Power Tong, Inc. v. Diamondback E&P, LLC, NO. 12-16-00092-
CV, 2017 WL 2588158 (Tex. App. May 31, 2017).  
 
Operator hired Casing Company to case several wells through a Master 
Service Agreement (“MSA”). At one well, after casing was complete, 
Operator was unable to continue drilling, and after several attempts to 
repair the well and casing, it made the decision to plug and abandon the 
well. Operator sued Casing Company for breach of contract and the jury 
found for Operator. Operator was granted around: (1) $824,000 in actual 
damages, (2) $319,000 in attorneys’ fees for trail, (3) $150,000 in 
conditional attorneys’ fees for an intermediate appellate case, (4) $75,000 in 
conditional attorneys’ fees for a supreme court case and (5) $3,500 in court 
costs. Casing Company appealed and raised five main issues: (1) the lack of 
legal and factual evidence to support a jury finding Casing Company’s 
breach of the MSA caused the damages, (2) Operator exacerbated its own 
damages and failed to mitigate damages, (3) the trial court abused its 
discretion in allowing in certain evidence to support damages, (4) jury’s 
award for damages are not supported by the evidence and excessive and (5) 
the evidence does not support attorneys’ fees for both trial and appellate 
work. The appellate court affirmed the trial court on: (1) there being 
sufficient evidence to find breach of the MSA, (2) Operator did not 
exacerbate own damages and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in allowing evidence supporting damages claims. The appellate court did 
suggest a remittitur for actual damages based on the evidence and reversed 
the trial court’s findings on the attorneys’ fees as it found Operator failed to 
show segregation of some of the fees. Operator timely filed its Notice of 
Formal Acceptance of Suggestion of Remittitur and accepted the slightly 
lower actual damages costs. Overall the case was affirmed in part and 
reversed and remanded only as to the trial attorneys’ fees.  
 
Reed v. Maltsberger/Storey Ranch, LLC, No. 04–16–00231–CV, 2017 WL 
1683717 (Tex. App. May 3, 2017). 
 
Unleased Mineral Owners (“Owners”) sued Lessee, arguing that Owners 
were entitled to a greater share of royalty than Lessee had been paying. The 
dispute involved a 1942 deed (“Deed”) to which Owners’ predecessor was 
the grantee. Deed granted “an undivided one-fourth interest in and to all the 
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oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced” from 
certain lands but also stripped the grantee of certain mineral rights, such as 
bonus and delay rentals. Owners believed they owned a one-quarter mineral 
interest and thus Lessee owed them one-quarter of the existing lease’s 
percentage royalty. Lessee counterclaimed, arguing for its part that Owners 
were entitled to only a 1/32 fixed royalty. Both parties sought summary 
judgment, and the trial court granted Lessee’s motion. The court found that 
the Deed conveyed a fixed nonparticipating royalty interest to Owners’ 
predecessor and thus Lessee was correct in paying the fixed royalty. 
Owners appealed. The court of appeals reversed. Drawing on treatises, 
Texas Supreme Court cases, and its own precedents, the court concluded 
that the Deed’s granting clause contained “traditional hallmarks of mineral 
fee ownership.” Moreover, the provision that “stripped” the grantee of other 
mineral rights was telling; if the grantor had intended a royalty interest—
rather than a mineral ownership interest—such stripping “would be 
redundant” because a royalty interest owner “has no such rights.” Thus, the 
court of appeals (1) held that the Deed conveyed to Owners’ predecessor a 
one-quarter mineral ownership interest and (2) remanded the case to the 
trial court for consideration of Owners’ request for attorney fees. 
 
Texas Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, No. 04-16-00392-CV, 2017 WL 
2124494 (Tex. App. May 17, 2017). 
 
Non-executive mineral interest owners (“Owners”) brought action against 
executive mineral interest rights and surface owners (“Executives”) for 
breach of fiduciary duty by refusing to lease Owners’ mineral interest. 
Executives received two offers in one year to lease the interests, but refused 
the options to protect the deer breeding business that occupied the surface. 
After a failure to come to an agreement for Owners to buy back the 
executive rights, Executives sold the executive rights and surface property 
to a third party. The executive rights holder has a duty of utmost fair 
dealing to Owner that is fiduciary in nature but does not require the same 
obligation to place the other party’s interests before its own. This generally 
allows the refusal of leases if maintaining the status quo; however, because 
Executives’ business on the surface benefitted from the refusal to execute a 
lease rather than maintaining the status quo, the refusal is a breach of duty. 
The appellate court found sufficient evidence for this decision and held that 
Executives breached their duty of utmost fair dealing by refusing to execute 
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Midstream – Federal 
 
Eighth Circuit  
 
Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 
Servient tenement owners (“Servient Owners”) brought putative class 
action against dominate tenement owner, Pipeline Company alleging that 
Pipeline Company breached easement contracts (“Easements”) by failing to 
reasonably operate, maintain, and repair the pipeline. Servient Owners 
sought either rescission of the Easements, the pipeline’s removal or 
replacement, or damages. The trial court decertified class action and entered 
summary judgment for Pipeline Company and Servient Owners appealed. 
The appellate court affirmed the judgment holding that Pipeline Company 
did not have duty to repair or maintain pipeline under the Easements with 
Servient Owners. Therefore, Pipeline Company had no liability under state 
law for breach of Easements where Easements contained no express 
contractual provision imposing duties of maintenance or repair. Further, 
these duties were not implicit, and Servient Owners did not show any 
physical injury to the properties, even if Pipeline Company operated in an 
unreasonable manner.  
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 857 F.3d 
388 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
Pipeline Company filed an application to extend an existing natural gas 
pipeline and to build new facilities across multiple states. In cooperation 
with federal law, Pipeline Company conducted an environmental 
assessment that passed standards but had the requirement of obtaining “all 
applicable authorization required under federal law,” including water 
quality certifications. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a 
certificate approving construction of the project upon the condition of those 
certifications. Environmental Group petitioned for review of the approval 
due to the lack of water quality certifications and the miscalculation and 
misidentification of specially protected wetlands. The D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the approval was not to be revoked because the condition 
approval did not affect any water quality due to the delay on parts of the 
project until after proper certification and the misidentification of wetlands 
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according to Environmental Group’s proposed standards was not enough be 
judged as prejudicial error.  
 
M.D. Pennsylvania   
 
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easement for 1.41 Acres, No. 
4:17-CV-0570, 2017 WL 2180366 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). 
 
Pipeline Company received a certificate of public conveyance from Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to construct a pipeline and 
various other associated pieces of infrastructure across several states. 
Pipeline Company filed the condemnation suit after Landowners desired 
unreasonable compensation for the right-of-way. Pursuant to federal law 
regarding pipelines, to condemn the easements for its pipeline, Pipeline 
Company must show: (1) it received the public conveyance from FERC, (2) 
the rights-of-ways to be condemned we necessary for the project and (3) the 
Pipeline Company has been unable to obtain rights-of-ways from 
Landowners. Company provided sufficient evidence that each of these 
factors applied to its pipeline project. Additionally, Landowners failed to 
reply to the summary judgement motion, so the court found for Pipeline 
Company on procedural and substantive grounds. 
 




Buggs v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., No. 329782, 2017 WL 2131506 (Mich. Ct. 
App. May 16, 2017). 
 
Two Landowners sued the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”), 
attempting to compel them to revoke a gas pipeline easement granted to an 
oil and gas corporation. While this proceeding was going through an appeal 
and remand, Landowners brought an additional suit to compel the DNR to 
revoke the easement. This action was based off of, among other things, the 
testimony of a man who believed he found two dead Kirkland’s Warblers, a 
protected species of bird, by the pipeline. The court stated that before it 
issues a writ of mandamus compelling an official or agency to do 
something, it must be proven that the action the movant is trying to compel 
the agency to make is within the agency’s responsibility and that the 
movant has a legal right to demand the action be taken. Here the court did 
not find that DNR had a responsibility to revoke the easement. The 
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evidence presented was that a layman thought he saw two dead birds that 
looked like Warblers but never produced the dead birds. This was not 
enough to create a responsibility for DNR to remove the pipeline easement. 
The immediate injunctive relief was denied and the prior case seeking the 
writ of mandamus will proceed. This case is an unpublished opinion of the 
court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case 
as precedent.  
 
In re Application of Encana Oil & Gas re Garfield 36 Pipeline, No. 329781 
& 329909, 2017 WL 2130276 (Mich. Ct. App. May 16, 2017). 
 
Citizens challenged a decision granting permission to Pipeline Company to 
build and operate natural gas pipelines due to the insufficient environmental 
impact assessments and the failure to study its effects on a certain bird 
population in the area. Citizens argued that the environmental assessment 
needed to be for the entire surrounding area, not just along the chosen route 
of the pipelines. However, the trial court found for Pipeline Company 
stating that there were no threatened or endangered species within the 
proposed easement and the construction methods to be used will limit 
damage to topsoil. The appellate court held that, considering the 
environmental impact assessments as well as supplemental information 
provided by Citizens, the trial court did not err in its decision in favor of 
Pipeline Company. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, 




In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 565 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 
2291693 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 24, 2017). 
 
Pipeline Company condemned certain lands to construct a pipeline, in 
accordance with state law, and Homeowners challenged Pipeline 
Company’s ability to use condemnation powers among other arguments. 
Pipeline Company properly possessed condemnation powers as a public 
utility for years prior, following the state utility agency’s showing that 
Pipeline Company provides a public service. Homeowners argued that 
Pipeline Company built two pipelines, though FERC only approved one 
such pipeline, but the court followed state and federal precedent that stated 
the commingling of transportation did not impact jurisdiction, and since the 
state utility agency approved the intrastate portions, and FERC approved 
the interstate, Pipeline Company complied with the law. Because Pipeline 
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Company possessed the condemnation powers of a public utility because 
the project benefited the public in numerous ways, Pipeline Company 
properly used state eminent domain powers. Finally, the court denied 
Homeowners’ collateral estoppel claim because the case cited by 





Concophillips Co. v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2017 UT App 68, No. 
20160221-CA, 2017 WL 1422974. 
 
Pipeline Company sued State Agency and general contractor (collectively, 
“Government”) for highway construction project alleging that wick drains 
installed during construction damaged anti-corrosion coating on pipeline, 
asserting claims for breach of contract and negligence. After a jury trial, the 
trial court entered judgment in favor of Pipeline Company and Government 
appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court holding that the 
purported expert who performed direct-current-voltage-gradient test on 
underground pipeline for purposes of determining if wick drains installed 
during highway construction project damaged the anti-corrosion coating, 
was not a qualified expert witness. Further, any error in not striking and not 
instructing jury to disregard, unsolicited expert opinion offered by fact 
witness invited error. Lastly, the cumulative error doctrine did not apply.  
 




M & G Servs. v. Buffalo Lake Advanced Biofuels, LLC, 895 N.W.2d 277 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Ethanol plant operator (“Operator”) appealed a foreclosure decision based 
on a mechanic’s lien filed by industrial contractor (“Contractor”). 
Contractor attached the lien to the ethanol plant, as well as the excess 
stillage produced as a by-product of the ethanol production process. 
Contractor alleges that the stillage constituted an improvement to the 
property, as Operator profited from its sale to local livestock feed lots. 
Although the ethanol production will inherently create this stillage by-
product, the court compared the removal of stillage to the removal of 
medical waste from a hospital: a necessary task, but not one that creates an 
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alteration or repair to the real property on which a lien may be applied. In 
addition, Contractor cannot lien the material furnished and labor for the 
removal of the stillage as these do not fall into the statutory language for a 
mechanic’s lien. 
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Fourth Circuit  
 
North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 
2017). 
 
North Carolina (“State”) commenced action against power generation 
company (“Company”), claiming that State owns a stretch of river 
Company has developed with four hydroelectric dams used to supply power 
to a smelting plant. The river would be the property of State if, at the time 
of statehood in 1789, the river was navigable. The historical record of such 
a small river is scarce, but the stretch of water was “shallow, steep, swift-
moving, rocky.” There was no record of commercial use of the area, and the 
common pole boats and flats of the time would have been extremely 
difficult to use in such terrain. There are more recent records of further 
failed navigation attempts. A river is legally navigable when used “as 
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be 
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” The 
district court found the river to be unnavigable at the time of statehood, and 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. State also 
claims that Company falls into an exception to adverse possession based on 
public trust rights. However, there is no solid basis for such an exception, 
and in North Carolina, any person vested with real property of record for 
thirty years or more, has marketable title. Company had openly acted as the 
sole owner of the riverbed for more than fifty years, and the circuit court 




Clear Creek Cmty. Servs. Dist. v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 223 (Fed. Cl. 
2017).  
 
Water District sued United States claiming breach of water services 
contract with Department of Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”), 
inverse condemnation, and declaratory relief. United States moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to state a claim, 
and for summary judgment. The Federal Claims Court found that: (1) Water 
District’s breach of contract claims against BOR were time barred, (2) a 
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factual issue remained as to breach of contract regarding water delivery and 
(3) the taking claim depriving Water District’s contractual right to receive 
up to 15,300 feet of water annually was not actionable because of the 
existence of a water services contract reduced to writing. Accordingly, the 
court granted United States’ motion for summary judgement in part and 






Select Energy Services, LLC v. K-Low LLC, 2017 CO 43, 394 P.3d 695.  
 
Water Right Owner (“Owner”) had purchased the property and subsequent 
water rights from a Previous Owner that had requested a new water rights 
decree (“New Decree”). The Original Decree had granted the original 
property owner rights to water diverted from farther upstream and rights to 
water in a Ditch along the property. In the New Decree the Previous Owner 
asked the diversion point to be moved downstream to a pump located on the 
property. When Owner bought the property and water rights, it sued 
Pipeline Company for trespass for trying to build a water pipeline along the 
Ditch. Pipeline Company filed suit in water court and moved for partial 
summary judgment on the determination that the New Decree did not grant 
Owner the right to divert water from the Ditch. The water court found for 
Pipeline Company, and Owner appealed arguing that the New Decree still 
granted Owner the right to divert water from the Ditch. The Supreme Court 
of Colorado affirmed the water court’s judgment holding that the New 
Decree only cited the Ditch as a source not a diversion point, and therefore 
Owner could only get water from the Ditch that flowed to the pump as 




Hill v. Suwannee River Water Mgmt. Dist., 217 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
 
Landowners sued Water District for recovery for alleged takings by Water 
District after Water District drained a reservoir across their land numerous 
times. Landowners allege that the draining deprived them of the viable and 
beneficial use of their property without compensation. Water District 
countered that judicial or quasi-judicial immunized itself from such claims. 
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Water District rested its claim on the fact that it acted under contempt 
orders issued by the court for Landowners failure to drain the pond 
themselves. To meet the judicial standard, Water District must have proven 
that: (1) the act take was a “judicial act” and (2) that Water District 
possessed jurisdiction to make such a ruling. To meet the quasi-judicial 
standard, the claiming party must prove that their action fictionally 
compares to that of judges. The court held that the draining of ponds onto 
Landowners land does not constitute a part of the judicial process, nor does 
it functionally compare to the work of judges. Therefore, the court reversed 




Doce Ltd. P’ship v. Sandridge Expl. & Prod., LLC, No. 16-1045-EFM-
KGG, 2017 WL 1836977 (D. Kan. May 8, 2017).  
 
Lessor sued Lessee after learning Lessee had been using leased land to 
dispose millions of barrels of water produced from its other oil and gas 
operations. Lessor alleged that disposing of off-lease water constituted a 
breach of contract and trespass. Lessor also asserted theory of unjust 
enrichment by disposing off-lease water without the right to do so. After 
filing suit, Lessor and Lessee each filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The court granted Lessee’s summary judgment motion and 
dismissed Lessor’s claims after reviewing the Surface Easement on which 
both parties relied in asserting their arguments. Taking into consideration: 
(1) the facts and outcome of an identical Louisiana case, (2) the custom of 
Kansas law that oil and gas leases convey to the operator the right to drill 
and operate a disposal well to dispose of on-lease water and (3) the 
language in the second paragraph of the Surface Easement; the court 
concluded that the only reasonable interpretation granted Lessee an 





Kowalchuk v. City of Jackson, No. 330463, 2017 WL 2262876 (Mich. Ct. 
App. May 23, 2017). 
 
Landowners filed suit against the city water supply (“City”) because of 
City’s pumping of groundwater which Landowners’ alleged deprived them 
of their property rights without just compensation.  State water law adopted 
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the reasonable use doctrine which allowed a private party to develop the 
water beneath its land, so long as the use of the water does not interfere 
with another’s right to use the water beneath his or her own land.  As long 
as City reasonably used the water it produced, then the action of pumping 
the water out of the ground did not constitute a taking under state water 
law.  The court rejected Landowners’ claim that City must condemn the 
area vacated by produced ground water, because Landowners do not own 
the water beneath their land. Landowners also failed to establish the 
numerosity requirement of a class certification and failed to prove that an 
actual injury occurred. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 





Mo.-Am. Water Co.’s Request for Auth. to Implement a Gen. Rate Increase 
for Water & Sewer Serv. Provided in Mo. Serv. Areas v. Office of Pub. 
Counsel, No. WD 79988, 2017 WL 2333056 (Mo. Ct. App. May 30, 2017). 
 
Utility Company provided, in the state of Missouri, water for hundreds of 
thousands of people through nineteen different water systems. Utility 
Company wished to consolidate all nineteen systems into three water 
districts and set a tariff schedule. The Public Service Commission (“PSC”) 
regulates the public utilities, so Utility Company sought permission from 
PSC to consolidate the nineteen systems into three districts. The Office of 
the Public Counsel and a multitude of other defendants (collectively 
“OPC”) fought the consolidation. OPC claimed that the statutory 
protections against utility companies overcharging for necessary utilities 
prevents Utility Company from consolidating the districts as some citizens 
will be forced to pay more for their water that want Utility Company pays. 
PSC ruled in favor of Utility Company, holding that the statute in question, 
which prevents price gouging from the utility company, does not mandate 
that Utility Company charge solely what it pays for water, but rather, that it 
not overcharge for the water overall. The consolidation plan does increase 
the cost of water for some, but it at the same time decreases the cost of 
water for others, resulting in a “wash.” OPC appealed and the appellate 
court affirmed PSC’s decision. 
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Coos Waterkeeper v. Port of Coos Bay Or., 395 P.3d 14 (Or. Ct. App. 
2017). 
 
Port sought from the Department of State Lands (“DSL”) a permit to dredge 
a portion of a bay to create a new multipurpose slip, marine terminal, and 
access channel connecting the bay and slip. Port used a single application to 
apply for authorization from the Corps of Engineers under federal law and 
DSL under the state’s fill-and-removal law. DSL issued a fill-and-removal 
permit to Port, and Environmental Group (“Group”) requested a contested 
case hearing. The ALJ issued a proposed order in Port’s favor, and DSL’s 
director issued a final order adopting the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. 
Group sought review in the state court of appeals, raising two arguments: 
(1) that DSL erred by concluding it need not consider the effects of the 
proposed terminal’s operation in deciding whether to grant Port’s 
application and (2) that DSL erred by concluding that the second of two 
phases of Port’s plan did not fall under DSL’s jurisdiction because the 
activities would not involve “waters of the state.” As to the first argument, 
the court held that the text, context, and legislative history of the relevant 
statute counseled that “project” as used in the statute refers to a removal or 
fill activity and not—as Group argued—any effects of the development’s 
future operation. As to the second argument, the court rejected three ways 
in which Group claimed DSL had jurisdiction over the plan’s second phase. 
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed DSL’s final order. 
 
Kramer v. Lake Oswego, 395 P.3d 592 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).  
 
Patrons brought action against city and state (collectively, “Government”) 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relating to public access to a lake 
and an adjoining bay for recreational use. The trial court granted 
Government’s motion for summary judgment in a dispute centering on a 
city ordinance that restricted the access to a lake and an adjoining bay, and 
dismissed the action. Patrons appealed, and the appellate court vacated and 
remanded the trial court’s judgment. It held that a trial court does not have 
to enter a declaratory judgment on whether the lake was a navigable body 
of water even though state statute authorized trial court to grant partial 
declaratory relief. Further, resolution was possible without issuing a 
declaration on the water’s navigability because the dispute centered on 
whether the state law preempted the city’s ordinance, not on whether the 
lake is considered navigable water. Moreover, even assuming the lake was 
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public and that the public-trust doctrine was applicable, Government had no 
obligation to provide public access to the lake from city parks. The 
rationale: Although the concept of a public trust requires protection of the 
public’s right to use navigable waters, it does not carry an obligation to 
ensure access to a waterway over adjoining uplands not likewise held in 
trust. Finally, appropriate disposition after granting Government’s summary 
judgment motion was a declaratory judgment determining parties’ rights 
rather than dismissal.   
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
600 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 






Legatt v. Legatt, No. A16-1255, 2017 WL 1316144 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 
10, 2017). 
 
One landowner (“CP Landowner”) installed a center pivot irrigation system 
on his farm that would cross over onto another landowner’s (“DI 
Landowner”) land. DI Landowner installed drip irrigation on his farm that 
required pipes to be buried under CP Landowner’s farm. Both landowners 
received from the other an easement to allow their irrigation systems to 
cross the other’s property. In unrelated litigation between the landowners, 
the trial court held that the easements were reciprocal. DI Landowner 
appealed that holding, stating that his easement was perpetual, and that CP 
Landowner’s easement was set to expire at the end of his lease. The 
appellate court held for DI Landowner. Later, CP Landowner brought suit 
stating that if it had to remove its center pivot, then DI Landowner should 
have to remove its drip irrigation pipes. The trial court ruled for CP 
Landowner, again finding them to be reciprocal. On appeal, the court held 
that, since the appellate court had already ruled the easements were not 
reciprocal years ago, CP Landowner had missed its opportunity to 
challenge the ruling. DI Landowner’s pipes did not have to be removed, as 
its easement was perpetual. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 




Branton v. Nicholas Meet, LLC, 159 A.3d 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).  
 
Neighbors sued several farms and a slaughterhouse (collectively “Farms”) 
for negligence and private nuisance due to the storage and spreading of 
food processing waste (“FPW”) on the Farms that caused a malodor at 
times. Neighbors claimed the spreading and storing of FPW violated state 
law because: (1) Farms were violating the regulations in how they spread 
FPW, (2) the spreading of FWP was not a normal agriculture operation and 
(3) the building of one of the storage tanks was a substantial change under 
state law and Neighbors were within the statute of limitations to file a 
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nuisance claim. The trial court found for Farms and granted summary 
judgment. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that state law only 
requires Farms to substantially comply with the law, and that Farms did as 
they only were cited for minor infractions which were quickly rectified. It 
also held that Farms had been spreading FPW or over a year at the point 
Neighbors filed their complaint and that spreading FPW is a normal 
agriculture operation. Therefore, the appellate court upheld the summary 
judgment in favor of Farms being able to continue to spread FPW. The 
appellate court did vacate and remand the summary judgment in favor of 
Farms 2,400,000 gallon storage tank holding that it was a substantial 
change to existing practices as there was no storage tank on that property 
beforehand, and that Neighbors filed their nuisance claim within one year 
of the storage tank being operational as required by state law. Therefore, the 
appellate court remanded the case to the trial court on this issue for further 
proceedings.  
 
Easements - Federal 
 
Eight Circuit  
 
Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electic Coop. LLC, 852 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2017).  
 
Landowners sued rural electric cooperative and its subsidiary (collectively 
“REC”) for trespass and unjust enrichment stemming from REC’s selling 
access capacity on its telecommunication lines for public use. Landowners 
argued the selling of access capacity violated the easements REC had, as it 
was only given easements for electrical use of actions associated with 
electric use. The district court found in favor of Landowners and granted 
summary judgment on both trespass and unjust enrichment claims, and a 
jury awarded approximately $79 million in damages based on the unjust 
enrichment claims. REC appealed arguing that it was within its easement 
rights to sell its excess capacity of telecommunication lines. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment on the trespass 
issue, citing state case law that had previously upheld trespass claims when 
utility companies had sold excess capacity of communication lines or power 
lines that were not within the original scope of the respective easements. 
The court overturned the summary judgment on the unjust enrichment 
claim, also citing state case law that previously listed four types remedies in 
this situation that did not include unjust enrichment. Because the unjust 
enrichment claim was overturned, the jury award was also overturned, but 
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the court held that on remand Landowners could seek an award based on 
the trespass claim.  
 
Tenth Circuit  
 
Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Barboan, 857 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 
A utility company (“Company”) had an easement over two parcels of land 
for the right to run electrical lines across the properties. There were 
multiple Landowners, one of which was an Indian tribe. While the 
easements worked for Company to accomplish its purpose, it wished to 
acquire the properties so that it no longer had to go through the process of 
receiving easements. Without receiving consent of all Landowners, it had to 
go through a condemnation process to acquire the land. The issue was 
whether New Mexico held the authority to condemn tribal land. Tribal land 
is held by the federal government in trust for the Indian tribes, so if New 
Mexico were to condemn this property, it would be condemning land 
legally owned by the U.S. Government. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the district court’s ruling stating that the state did not have the 
authority to condemn federally held land.  
 
W.D. Oklahoma  
 
Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, L.P., No. CIV–15–1262–M, 2017 
WL 1169710 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2017). 
 
Native American landowners (“Landowners”) sued the owner and operator 
of a natural gas transmission pipeline (“Midstream Operator”) for trespass. 
Landowners also sought a permanent injunction to require Midstream 
Operator to remove certain pipelines from Landowner’s property. The 
dispute arose following termination of a term right-of-way in favor of 
Midstream Operator’s predecessor. Landowners refused Midstream 
Operator’s request to renew the right-of-way, and the Department of 
Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) determined that it lacked 
authority to grant the right-of-way without Landowners’ consent. 
Undeterred, Midstream Operator continued using the natural gas pipeline. 
The district court granted Landowners’ motion for summary judgment on 
both claims. First, the court concluded that obtaining consent forms from 
various tenants-in-common to Landowners’ property failed to satisfy the 
requirements of a federal statute governing easements across Indian trust 
lands. That statute required consent from owners of a majority of the 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/10
2017]        Recent Case Decisions 603 
  
 
interests in a tract, and any defense based on state law did not apply to the 
case. Second, the court concluded that a permanent injunction was proper. 
Even though BIA advised Midstream Operator’s predecessor that it should 
remove the pipeline if the right-of-way was not renewed, Midstream 
Operator did nothing to move the pipeline when its negotiations with 
Landowners failed. Moreover, Midstream Operator’s continuing trespass on 
Landowner’s property was clearly intentional. This case has since been 
appealed but there is no final decision from the higher court as of 
publication.  
 




Hinrichs v. Melton, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Landowner A inherited two parcels of property that were connected, and 
parcel 1 had to be crossed to access parcel 2. Landowner A inherited the 
properties while he was living away from the land, and decided to sell 
parcel 1 to Landowner B. Once parcel 1 was transferred to Landowner B 
parcel 2 was completely landlocked. Landowner A later tried to get an 
easement on parcel 1 from Landowner B to access parcel 2, but Landowner 
B refused. This suit then commenced with Landowner A asking the court to 
grant an equitable easement. Landowner B’s reasoning for not giving 
Landowner A the easement is that it was Landowner A who landlocked his 
property and, for that reason, he should face the implications of his actions. 
The court found in favor of Landowner A, granting the easement, finding 
that the actions of Landowner A, land-locking his own property, did not bar 




Thurlow v. Hulten, 173 Conn. App. 694 (2017). 
 
Landowner and Neighbor disputed whether easements for Landowner 
existed over Neighbor’s property. In the trial court, Landowner argued that 
Neighbor interfered with Landowner’s right to access its landlocked 
property via easements over Neighbor’s property. Neighbor’s property 
contained two adjacent lots. As to the first, Landowner claimed an express 
easement. As to the second, Landowner claimed an easement by necessity 
or an easement by implication. For its part, Neighbor argued that 
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Landowner had been trespassing and sought to quiet title to the disputed 
property. Neighbor claimed that any easement—if one existed—was 
limited to the first lot. Neighbor also sought to enjoin Landowner’s use of 
the second lot to access its property. The trial court rejected Landowner’s 
claim, concluding that it had no easement over Neighbor’s second lot 
because it could not prove necessity and could not prove intent on the part 
of Neighbor or its predecessor. Further, and among other relief, the court 
denied Landowner’s request for injunction to prevent Neighbor from 
blocking access to the second lot. Both parties appealed. The court of 
appeals summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court, simply adopting 




Hochgesang v. McLain, No. 13A01-1608-PL-1944, 2017 WL 2492577 
(Ind. Ct. App. June 9, 2017).  
 
Landowner appealed trial court conclusion that it failed to establish the 
existence of a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence 
alone. Landowner appealed raising the sole issue of whether trial court 
committed error in its judgment. The appellate court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision because Landowner could not establish intent. This 
jurisdiction’s case law generally disfavors prescriptive easements such that 
a party claiming one must meet stringent requirements including: (1) 
control, (2) intent, (3) notice and (4) duration. Based on the record, 
appellate court found that Landowner did not meet its evidentiary burden 
and as such the court could not find that the trial court erred in its judgment. 
Further, the appellate court declined to give more weight to certain 
evidence in the record as such tasks remains with the trial court. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 




Twp. of Lockport v. City of Three Rivers, No. 331711, 2017 WL 1927859 
(Mich. Ct. App. May 9, 2017). 
 
City purchased land from private landowners through which Township 
owned an easement for its underground water-transmission line. City later 
approved a resolution to annex the land. Township objected and sued City 
to prevent the annexation. The trial court entered a temporary restraining 
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order but ultimately (1) denied Township’s motion for preliminary 
injunction and (2) granted summary judgment for City. The trial court 
reasoned that City could annex the land because it was “vacant” within the 
meaning of the relevant state statute. Township appealed, and the court of 
appeals reversed. The court noted that although the statute does not define 
the word “vacant,” the court’s cases—relying on the word’s plain 
meaning—had interpreted the word as referring to land that is “not put to 
use.” Here, neither party disputed that Township “currently and constantly” 
used the land for its water transmission line. Thus, the land was not 
“vacant” for purposes of the statute. Had Township’s use of the land been 
merely temporary or seasonal, the court’s precedents might have required a 
different outcome, but those were “simply not the facts” at issue. Moreover, 
and contrary to City’s arguments, the court stated that the statute’s use of 
the word “property” clearly contemplated “the space below the surface” of 
the land. The court thus remanded to the trial court for entry of an order of 




Doran Dev., LLC v. Se. Props., Inc., A16-1091, 2017 WL 2062055 (Minn. 
Ct. App. May 15, 2017). 
 
Development Company filed suit against two Property Owners (“Owner 1” 
and “Owner 2”) to enforce a right to easements contained in a Purchase 
Agreement between the parties.  Owner 2 filed counterclaims against 
Development Company and Owner 1. Owner 1 and Development Company 
stipulated a dismissal of claims between them, and Development Company 
and Owner 2 entered into an unwritten Settlement Agreement.  
Development Company later informed Owner 2 that it no longer wished to 
abide by the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Because no writing existed 
to finalize the Settlement Agreement, it failed to satisfy the statue of frauds. 
It also failed to rise to the level of partial performance or promissory 
estoppel against Development Company. Owner 2 also asserted that the 
access easement granted to Owner 1 constituted a breach of the Purchase 
Agreement. Although the easement differed slightly from the terms of the 
Purchase Agreement, the differences did not rise to the level of a breach of 
the agreement because the variances still fit within the catchall provisions 
of the easement portions of the Purchase Agreement.  Finally, the court 
denied Owner 2’s argument that the easement be disregarded under the 
doctrine of contemporaneous transaction. This opinion is an unpublished 
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opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before 




Mills v. Majette, No. COA16-1145, 2017 WL 2118723 (N.C. Ct. App. May 
16, 2017).  
 
Homeowners’ property was setback from the road, and thus they were 
granted an easement across the strip of land to the road. Homeowners’ used 
the easements regularly and even built two different driveways across the 
land. Property Owners owned the strip of land, approximately ten acres 
behind Homeowners’ property, and other nearby lands. State cited Property 
Owners for deficiencies in their lands needing repair, and included 
Homeowners’, both of whom eventually settled with State. In making the 
necessary repairs, Property Owners damaged and blocked Homeowners’ 
easements. Homeowners’ and one Property Owner reached a settlement 
agreement (“Agreement”), which the court approved, and Property Owner 
began to follow through on. Then two Property Owners no longer agreed 
the issue had been settled and filed a motion for summary judgment arguing 
that: (1) there was no meeting of the minds to create an official contract and 
(2) that the one Property Owner did not have the authority to bind the other 
two. The trial court found for the Homeowners’ and granted their motion to 
enforce the Agreement, which the two Property Owners appealed. The 
appellate court held that: (1) there was an adequate evidence to prove there 
was a meeting of the minds and (2) that there was not adequate evidence to 
prove that the one Property Owner had the power to bind the other two 
Property Owners’ besides his familial relationship with them. The court 
ultimately affirmed the trial court in part and reversed and remanded in 
part. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court 




Lenn v. Lane Cty., 285 Or. App 520 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).  
 
Property Owner land was burdened by an easement for Neighbor to access 
its property. County amended its easement width requirements, requiring 
them to be wider, and then Neighbor partitioned to separate out almost two 
acres of its property. County approved the partitioning and grandfathered in 
the original easement to stay at its original width. Property Owners sued 
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arguing the petition should not have been granted because it cancelled out 
the current grandfathered easement that is narrower than required. Both 
County and the trial court affirmed the interpretation that even with the 
partitioning of the property the easement remained grandfathered in under 
the narrower width. On appeal Property Owner argued its original argument 
that the partition should not be allowed because there would no longer be a 
legal easement to Neighbor’s property and that the easement should not be 
grandfathered in because there are other access points to Neighbor’s 
property. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the 
easement was not destroyed and dismissed the argument on other access 





Kave v. McIntosh Ridge Primary Rd. Ass’n, 394 P.3d 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2017). 
 
A residential community (“Community”) brought suit against a Landowner, 
trying to quiet title in easements across Landowner’s property. When 
Landowner purchased his property from the community, it was burdened by 
several easements across the property. However, the trails that were used to 
cross Landowner’s property did not cross the land that was covered by the 
easements. It was for this reason that Landowner tore down some fences 
and benches, as they were on parts of his property not burdened by the 
easements. Community sued, asking the court to alter the easement so that 
it covered the land currently being used as a trail rather than the land that 
was actually burdened by the easement. The trial court found in favor of 
Community and granted the request as well as fees of $237,000. Landowner 
appealed and the appellate court reversed, stating that the trial court did not 




Whaley v. Flitner Ltd. P’ship, 2017 WY 59, 395 P.3d 653 (Wyo. 2017). 
 
Landowners appealed the decision which created a new access road for 
numerous parties, but created an easement across Landowners’ property in 
perpetuity. Landowners desired the creation of a new access road, as 
climate and upkeep limited access via existing roads.  Landowners argued 
that the state private road statue required the review board (“Board”) to 
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locate the road along the route as included in the proposal by Landowners. 
Although the road must follow the general path of the proposal, because of 
notice requirements to affected landowners, Board may alter the exact route 
of the road beyond the exact bounds of the proposal. Landowners also 
argued that Board’s determination of the most convenient route violated 
case law and was illogical based on the evidence presented. The Wyoming 
Supreme Court found that the case law cited by Landowners did not compel 
Board to abide by Landowners’ choice, and the evidence did not render 
Board’s decision illogical.  
 
Other Land Issues – Federal  
 
Sixth Circuit  
 
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Jones, No. 16–6342, 2017 WL 1969488 (6th Cir. May 
12, 2017). 
 
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) sued Landowner for trespass and 
violation of the federal Tennessee Valley Authority Act (“Act”). In 1939, 
TVA acquired a certain strip of land along the southern bank of a river. 
Some fifty years later, Landowner purchased land away from the bank but 
adjacent to TVA’s riverside strip. Landowner sought TVA’s permission to 
build private water-use facilities on the river’s edge, but TVA denied the 
request. Landowner then acquired a right of way through TVA’s property to 
a riverside landing. Believing he owned the landing itself, Landowner again 
sought TVA’s permission to build, which TVA again denied. Undeterred, 
Landowner spent the next two decades building upon and modifying the 
riverside area he regarded as his landing; Landowner built a launch ramp, a 
dock, and a boathouse. During that period, TVA consistently warned 
Landowner that his structures violated the Act. After TVA sued, the district 
court issued a permanent injunction requiring Landowner to remove the 
riverside structures. Landowner appealed, and the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed. The court stated that regardless of whether Landowner 
actually owned the landing, the Act required him to obtain TVA’s approval 
before building the structures. Landowner failed to do so, repeatedly 
ignoring TVA’s warnings regarding the Act. Moreover, the court held that 
the district court’s permanent injunction was not an abuse of discretion: 
among other things, any hardship befalling Landowner was foreseeable 
rather than undue because “he chose to build the structures without a permit 
at all.” This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.   
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Estate of Hage v. United States, No. 2016-1330, 2017 WL 1406500 (Fed. 
Cir. Apr. 20, 2017).  
 
Landowners appealed a ruling denying their ability to bring a claim against 
the Federal Government (“Government”), which alleged that Government’s 
alleged harassment and threats of prosecution constituted a taking of their 
property rights. Landowners’ rest their claim on a previous appellate court’s 
remand that ordered “further proceedings consistent with [that] opinions.” 
Landowners contended that that phrase allowed them to challenge 
Government’s harassment regarding the restriction of their water rights. 
Government contended that such previous court rulings precluded such an 
argument as already decided. The court found that the previous ruling on 
this issue foreclosed Landowners’ ability to challenge Government’s action 
as previous appeals rendered judgment on the issue in the favor of 
Government. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Federal Claims  
 
Haggart v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 628 (Fed. Cl. 2017).  
 
Landowners are two members of a class of landowners (“Class”) that had 
filed a class action suit against the Government for an improper taking of 
their lands when the government converted the right-of-way held by the 
railroad to one used for recreational trails under federal law. After a series 
of cases certifying the Class and then breaking it down into smaller Classes, 
a final settlement agreement (“Settlement”) was finally approved awarding 
the whole Class $110,000,000 plus attorney fees. Landowners objected to 
the attorney fees and to the valuation of their property. After a fairness 
hearing, the district court approved the Settlement, and Landowners 
appealed both the Settlement approval and the attorney fees. Government 
supported Landowners’ position that the award should be allocated 
differently, but did not appeal itself. The appellate court reversed the 
Settlement and required that full disclosure on the method for evaluating 
the different properties be disclosed. While the disclosures were made, 
there was no discussion on reallocation, and Government changed its 
position on the of the property values based on the outcome of a similar 
case in another district. After establishing a new procedural schedule, 
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Government and Landowners filed for various summary judgments, to 
which the Class filed a motion to enforce the Settlement as agreed upon. 
The trial court denied Government’s and Landowners’ various summary 
judgments finding that: (1) some of the motions were moot and (2) 
subsequent changes in the law after a binding Settlement is reached will not 
change the Settlement. The trial court granted the Class’s motion to enforce 
the judgment as is, with room to reallocate the already awarded amount as 
need be.  
 
S.D. Florida  
 
JAWHBS LLC. v. Arevalo, No. 15-CV-24176, 2017 WL 1345141 (S.D. Fla. 
Mar. 21, 2017). 
 
Challenger brought a claim of collusion against prior property buyers 
(“Buyers”) for their efforts to drive down the price of particular land 
pursuant to a bankruptcy sale. Challenger alleges that Buyers conversed 
with one another and participated in a scheme to push out other potential 
buyers and cut the purchase price to nearly half of the property’s true value. 
Buyers sought to dismiss the claims for failure to state a claim. The court 
denied the motion as to certain members of Buyers, as their actions 
constituted what could reasonably be construed as a violation of federal and 
state anti-trust statutes. However, the court dismissed the remainder of 
Buyers. The court additionally dismissed the claims for punitive damages, 
civil aiding and abetting and tortious interference.  
 




SIMA Props., L.L.C. v. Cooper, No. 2160132, 2017 WL 1291130 (Ala. Civ. 
App. Apr. 7, 2017).  
 
Operator brought inverse condemnation action against director of state 
agency and city (collectively, “Government”) after it closed a driveway 
adjacent to a highway. Government moved to dismiss Operator’s suit, 
which the trial court granted causing Operator to appeal. The appellate 
court reversed and remanded case for several reasons. First, sovereign 
immunity did not time bar Operator’s inverse condemnation action; an 
exception to sovereign immunity existed for a valid inverse-condemnation 
action brought against a government official in its representative capacity. 
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Second, Operator’s allegations that by closing driveway Government 
interfered with its right of access from highway, which it obtained by its 
being an abutting landowner, did in fact state a claim for inverse 
condemnation against Government. Although Operator did not own 





City of Kaia’I v. Hanalei River Holdings Ltd., 394 P.3d 741 (Haw. 2017).  
 
County condemned three properties that were next to each other that were 
all owned by the same property owner or his business (collectively 
“Property Owner”). Based on this condemnation action there were three 
main issues that arose throughout the case. The issues were whether: (1) the 
trial court could allow County to withdraw money from the compensation 
fund (“Fund”) when it was appraised a lower amount than originally 
appraised for the properties, (2) Property Owner was entitled to severance 
damages for the easement he owned across a neighboring property and (3) 
the trial court correctly calculated the interest on the Fund. The appellate 
court held that: (1) the trial court could allow County to withdraw from the 
Fund, (2) that Property Owner was not entitled to severance damages based 
on state and federal common law and (3) that the amount of the interest was 
correct, but incorrectly calculated by the trial court. Property Owner 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Hawai’i that held: (1) the trial court could 
allow County to withdraw from the Fund, (2) Property Owner was not 
entitled to severance damages, but for slightly different reasoning than the 
trial and appellate courts found, and (3) that the appellate court correctly 




Mathers v. Wakulla City, No. 1D16–0582, 2017 WL 1655252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. May 2, 2017). 
 
A dispute arose between adjoining landowners on a dead-end gravel road 
(“Road”). Road was the only means of ingress and egress for the residences 
it served. Landowner built a fence and gate to block Neighbor from using 
Road. After Neighbor proceeded through the gate, Landowner chained it 
closed. The county sheriff’s office responded to the dispute. Neighbor 
claimed that Road was publicly owned and thus Landowner had no right to 
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obstruct Neighbor’s passage; but County declared that Road was private. 
Neighbor sued Landowner and County, seeking a declaration that Road was 
public property based on statutory dedication. At trial, both Neighbor and 
County moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted County’s 
motion, reasoning: (1) private parties could not invoke the dedication 
statute and (2) dedication did not occur because County did not accept 
ownership of Road. The court of appeals reversed in Neighbor’s favor, 
holding that acceptance is not an element of statutory-presumed dedication 
and that private parties may invoke the statute. Moreover, the court 
remanded the case for further proceedings because a fact issue remained 
regarding whether County had maintained or repaired Road for the 
statutorily-prescribed period. 
 
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-cv-063-MW-GRJ, 
2017 WL 2783995 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017). 
 
Landowner owned land that a natural gas company (“Company”) sought to 
condemn to use for part of its public utility efforts. Company was trying to 
condemn the property under the federal law, the Federal Power Act 
(“FPA”). Landowner was seeking to have the land valued under the state 
condemnation legislation, the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). The reason for the 
difference was the state of Florida provided a “full compensation” 
condemnation valuation for the property, which was more than the value 
under FPA. The federal court held that, because this was eminent-domain 
condemnation with a private party, Company, taking the land of another 
private party, Landowner, state law applies so that Florida’s NGA applied, 




Whipple v. Vill. of N. Utica, 2017 IL App (3d) 150547, 2017 WL 1506057. 
 
A Landowner sued the Village of North Utica (“Village”), seeking an 
enforcement of zoning laws to keep a mining company (“Company”) from 
opening a mine right next to his land. The Landowner claimed that 
Company’s operations would be a private nuisance and is seeking 
injunctive relief. The lower court dismissed the nuisance claim on a 
summary judgement motion, stating that, because the mining operation was 
not yet underway, there were no specific damages that Landowner could 
base his claim upon to receive the injunctive relief. However, on appeal, the 
court held that summary judgment was inappropriate as Landowner could 
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provide facts that would support a private nuisance claim. Facts like 
Company producing continuous light and noise, constant truck traffic 
hauling loads of sand, creation of dust, etc. were enough to deny Village’s 




Drakes Creek Holding Co. v. Franklin-Simpson Cty. Bd. of Zoning 
Adjustment, 518 S.W.3d 174 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Landowners sought a conditional-use permit (“Permit”) from the local 
Board of Zoning Adjustment (“BZA”) to operate a rock quarry on certain 
properties. These properties were accessible only by a narrow county road 
(“Road”). After a lengthy and hotly-disputed public hearing, BZA granted 
Permit because the quarry would “benefit the community by creating jobs 
and increasing competition.” Neighbors appealed BZA’s decision to the 
trial court. Meanwhile, the local government issued various ordinances, one 
of which prohibited commercial trucks from accessing Road. To reach the 
quarry, trucks began using a private haul road. In view of the ordinances, 
BZA scheduled a hearing and revoked the Permit, reasoning that 
Landowners no longer complied with the Permit’s conditions. Landowners 
sought review in the trial court, which concluded that the Permit was 
properly issued and improperly revoked. The court of appeals affirmed. The 
court concluded that BZA had a sufficient basis for issuing Permit as: (1) 
the quarry was a proper conditional use for the area’s zoning, (2) the quarry 
served the public interest and (3) the Permit did not violate Neighbor’s due 
process rights. Moreover, BZA “erroneously concluded” that the ordinances 
made it “impossible” to comply with Permit. Though the ordinances made 
it difficult to comply with BZA’s conditions, “uncertain commercial 
feasibility does not equal impossibility.” Thus, revocation was arbitrary, 
and the trial court properly reinstated Permit. 
 
Sw. Clark Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. Branham, NP. 2015-CA-001645-
MR, 2017 WL 1193184 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017).  
 
Mining Company applied for a zoning change to allow it to mine limestone 
on a 103-acre track. The original application was denied by Planning 
Commission for various reasons. After acquiring additional land and 
changing the mine from a surface mine to an underground mine Mining 
Company reapplied for the zoning change. There was then an open hearing 
on the application in front of Planning Commission, in which both Mining 
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Company and Neighborhood Association which opposed the mine got to 
present their sides. Planning Commission recommended the denial of the 
amendment, but sent the recommendation to the fiscal court (“CCFC”) for 
final decision. CCFC went through the public record from the hearing and 
allowed both sides to state their opinions before making the decision to 
allow the change in zoning, finding the change appropriate and that the 
current zoning was inappropriate. Neighborhood Association appealed to 
the trial court that affirmed CCFC findings. Neighborhood Association then 
appealed. The appeals court held that CCFC’s finding that the amendment 
was appropriate and that the current zoning was inappropriate as it was only 
supposed to find one or the other, but otherwise upheld the amendment to 
the zoning ordinances in favor of CCFC and Mining Company. This 
opinion is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 




Duncan Oil, Inc. v. State of La. Mineral & Energy Bd., 2016-988 (La. App. 
3 Cir. 4/19/17); 216 So. 3d 861. 
 
In this action, the Louisiana State Mineral and Energy Board (“State”) 
sought to recover land from an oil and gas company (“Company”) and the 
tract’s current owners, another oil and gas company and individual 
landowner (“Owners”). Company had acquired the land and used it for oil 
and gas exploration until Owners acquired the land through a 1983 
redemption and 1984 tax sale. The land Owners purchased was described 
by both an acreage amount and in legal description. The challenge comes 
from State, saying that the land purchased by the owners is far less than the 
acreage amount put in the description. The legal description of the property 
only conveyed a small fraction of the acreage described, the acreage that 
Owners thought they had purchased. The court looked at the claims by 
State and granted Owners’ request for summary judgment, in large part, 
because State was collecting taxes from Owners as if they were the owners 










Bugai v. Ward Lake Energy, No. 331551, 2017 WL 1337476 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Apr. 11, 2017). 
 
Snowmobiler suffered injuries after being ejected from his snowmobile 
while crossing Operator’s well-site access road. Notably, Snowmobiler did 
not pay Operator a fee to ride on the property. Snowmobiler sued Operator 
for his injuries, alleging that Operator breached a duty owed to riders by 
failing to properly maintain the road or warn riders of danger. Operator 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state’s Recreational Land 
Use Act (“RUA”) barred Snowmobiler’s claim; RUA protects landowners 
from liability for injuries suffered by nonpaying recreational users of land. 
The trial court denied the motion, finding that RUA applied only to land “in 
its natural state” and that the plowed road and resultant snowbanks were 
manmade. The court of appeals reversed in Operator’s favor. The court 
began by noting that RUA applied because the Michigan Supreme Court 
had overruled the case that the trial court cited for its “natural state” rule 
under RUA. Based on the Supreme Court’s ruling, RUA does not limit its 
application “to any particular type of land.” Because RUA applied, 
Snowmobiler was required to show that his injuries were the result of 
Operator’s gross negligence or willful misconduct. In the appellate court’s 
view, there was no evidence that Operator was extremely indifferent to 
potential rider injuries or intended to cause harm. To the contrary, Operator 
plowed and maintained the road, therefore the court reversed the trial 
court’s opinion. This is an unpublished opinion by the court; therefore, state 
court rules should be consulted before citing the opinion as precedent.  
 
New York  
 
Blanchfield v. Town of Hoosick, 53 N.Y.S.3d 226 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 
Landowner operated a dog training and handling business on certain 
property. After Landowner’s neighbors complained about noise, the local 
Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) advised Landowner that her activities 
violated local land-use laws. To continue operating her business, 
Landowner needed to obtain a special-use permit. Landowner sought such 
permit before ZBA. ZBA—after public hearings—denied Landowner’s 
application, citing the “foreseeable impact of dog noise” on neighbors. 
Landowner sought review before the state trial court, which dismissed 
Landowner’s petition. The court of appeals reversed, holding that ZBA’s 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
616 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
determinations lacked sufficient support in the record. The court 
highlighted that ZBA identified no specific shortcomings with Landowner’s 
noise-mitigation measures and that Landowner “offered scientific 
measurement of the noise level” at the public hearing. Because no reliable 
evidence rebutted Landowner’s claims, there was nothing in the record to 
suggest Landowner failed to meet the land-use law’s conditions. The court 
concluded by noting that ZBA simply “bowed to generalized objections” 
from Landowner’s neighbors. 
 
In re Eagle Creek Land Res., LLC, 52 N.Y.S.3d 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 
Hydroelectric Company operated energy producing facilities in Northeast 
United States. Hydroelectric Company had received a license from the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to operate these 
facilities. One condition to that license was that Hydroelectric Company 
had to maintain a public recreational area on the waterway. Hydroelectric 
Company opened a boat launch with a fifteen-car parking lot to be used by 
the public, meeting that requirement. Later, Developing Company 
purchased all the land around the boat launch and developed a high-end 
gated residential community (“Community”). This effectively blocked the 
access to the boat launch and parking lot. When Hydroelectric Company 
attempted to transfer the FERC license, FERC denied the transfer as 
Hydroelectric Company failed to keep open the boat launch for the public 
to access. Hydroelectric Company then condemned a portion of the land to 
ensure use of the boat launch for the public. Community brought suit and 
the trial court awarded it $297,000 for the land as a condemning entity must 
pay fair market value of the land that was condemned. Community 
appealed, stating that the actual damage caused by the condemnation was 
much more, bringing in experts stating that the damage was multiple 
millions of dollars as now Community was no longer a private gated 
community. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding 
no abuse in the lower court’s discretion to disregard the appraisals.  
 
Tomhannock, LLC v. Roustabout Resources, LLC, 51 N.Y.S.3d 671 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2017).  
 
Original Landowner conveyed a deed for almost sixteen acres of land that 
contained a ten year option to have three and one-half acres reconvened to 
Original Landowner. Through a series of conveyances Current Landowner 
held the deed to the property, but refused to reconvey the three and one-half 
acres when Original Landowner exercised its option. Original Landowner 
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sued for specific performance under the option, and Current Landowner’s 
defense was that Original Landowner never recorded the reconveyance 
deed. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Original 
Landowner, requiring Current Landowner to sign the reconveyance deed 
within 30 days. Current Landowner appealed and the appellate court upheld 
the summary judgment.  
 
North Dakota  
 
Goodall v. Monson, 2017 ND 92, 893 N.W.2d 774. 
 
Landowner A and Landowner B entered into a contract to convey land. The 
deed was drafted and a receipt was issued officially conveying the land and 
evidencing the sale. The deed was drafted with ambiguities on its face 
though. Landowner B brought suit, claiming that Landowner A did not own 
what he was asserting. Landowner B tried admitting into evidence the 
purchase contract and receipt, but under North Dakota law, parol evidence 
is generally not admissible to interpret a deed. This was Landowner A’s 
defense, stating that the instruments of the sale were not to be admitted. On 
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that when a deed is 
ambiguous on its face, the court may use extrinsic evidence to clarify the 
unclear. The evidence admitted cannot rebut superior evidence, the deed, 
but can clear up any ambiguities the deed has on its face. 
 
Huebner v. Furlinger, 2017 N.D. 145, 896 N.W.2d 258. 
 
Heirs to an estate were seeking to quiet the title of their mineral interests in 
a property that they inherited. This required notice to be given to any 
potential claimants of the property. Heirs had an attorney conduct research 
to find all potential claimants and then proceeded to mail notices to the 
claimants that were found. One of the claimant’s address came up without a 
zip code, so Heirs applied a zip code to the address prior to the mailing. 
After the requisite time, Heirs brought the quiet title action and Claimant 
whose address had been altered by applying the zip code to the address 
came forward to defend his interest in the mineral rights. Heirs stated that 
Claimant should be estopped as he did not come forward when the notice 
was mailed out. However, the court held that when dealing with the mineral 
interested, Heirs had an obligation to use the mailing address exactly as it 
was on the records they received it from. By adding the zip code to 
Claimant’s mailing address, the notice was not valid for purposes of 
estopping Claimant, therefore, the quiet title action failed. 
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Sorenson v. Bakken Invs. LLC, 2017 ND 127, 895 N.W.2d 302. 
 
Landowner A and Landowner B have previously litigated over property, 
with the first of three judgments being rendered in 2010. In the 2010 action 
Landowner A entered into a settlement agreement without representation by 
counsel. This resulted in a quiet title action in favor of Landowner B. There 
was no appeal. Landowner B brought another quiet title action in 2012, and 
again prevailed. In 2016 Landowner A brought this action requesting that 
the court reconsider the judgments rendered in 2010 and 2012. The court 
ruled in favor of Landowner B, holding that Landowner A’s decision not to 
appeal those decisions then had made them finalized. The Supreme Court of 
North Dakota affirmed the lower court judgment upholding Landowner B’s 




Boardman Acquisition, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 393 P.3d 1147 (Or. 2017). 
 
Taxpayer conveyed property that was previously entitled to the state’s 
farmland special assessment (“Assessment”). Where Assessment applies, 
land has a reduced value for property-tax purposes. But when the land 
becomes disqualified for Assessment, taxes previously avoided are added to 
the next property assessment and tax roll. Sometimes an exception applies. 
Taxpayer had leased the property for farm purposes. When the lease 
expired, Taxpayer requested that the county assessor (“Assessor”) 
disqualify the property for Assessment. Even after conveying the property, 
Taxpayer agreed to pay taxes previously avoided. Taxpayer later sought a 
refund, arguing that an exception applied such that it did not owe the taxes 
previously avoided. Assessor denied the refund, and Taxpayer sued the 
Department of Revenue (“Department”). The tax court found that the 
relevant exception did not apply to the land, and the Oregon Supreme Court 
affirmed. The exception at issue applied to land that was: (1) public 
property, (2) which the owner had leased and (3) where the reason for 
disqualification was termination of the lease. Importantly, the exception 
applied only when each of those factors was true “as of the date the 
disqualification [was] taken into account on the assessment and tax roll.” 
The court agreed with Department that the disqualification was “taken into 
account” on the first day of the following year, not the day Taxpayer gave 
notice to Assessor. Because none of the exception’s factors were true on the 
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day the disqualification was taken into account, Taxpayer was not entitled 




Thomas v. Thomas, No. W2016-01412-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1404353 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).  
 
Transferees appealed trial court’s ruling that sole ownership of property in 
dispute belonged to Transferors because of Transferees’ non-payment of 
taxes and the applicable theories of prescriptions and unjust enrichment. 
This dispute concerned farm property where the deed recites ownership as 
one-half to Transferors and one-fourth each to two Transferees. The 
appellate court addressed Transferees’ issues, and articulated several 
findings. First, although Transferees never paid taxes on property, state law 
does not prevent Transferees from defending title once Transferors claim 
full ownership right, nor does it prevent Transferees from suing Transferors 
for partition of property absent evidence of ouster. Second, trial court erred 
in applying state case law because Transferors did not successfully raise 
presumption of title by prescription, as Transferors did not show they 
possessed and used the land to the exclusion of the Transferees for at least 
twenty years. Third, Transferors cannot assert unjust enrichment theory 
because their payments for the property and titling of interest in 
Transferees’ names over thirty years prior constituted voluntary acts for 
which the record did not reflect the Transferors desire to seek 
reimbursement in the future. The court reversed and remanded the case to 




Davis v. Maxwell, No. 2016–381, 2017 WL 1506426 (Vt. Apr. 24, 2017). 
 
Farmer owned land through which County acquired a right-of-way 
(“ROW”). Farmer conveyed most of the property to Landowner but 
retained a one-acre lot for a residence. Land surveys indicated that the one-
acre lot’s eastern boundary was the western edge of ROW. Landowner 
conveyed her property to Neighbor and acquired the one-acre lot from 
Farmer. A boundary dispute arose between Landowner and Neighbor when 
Neighbor drove farm equipment over what Landowner believed was her 
front lawn. Landowner blocked passage by placing boulders in the area. 
Neighbor filed a quiet title action against Landowner, and the trial court 
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ruled for Neighbor. On appeal, Landowner argued that: (1) she was 
presumably the owner of the land to the centerline of ROW and (2) she 
acquired title to the disputed area by adverse possession based on her (and 
her predecessor’s) use of the area. In rejecting the first argument, the 
Vermont Supreme Court held that an earlier deed “unambiguously 
established” that the eastern boundary of Landowner’s lot was the western 
edge of the ROW. Thus, the “centerline presumption” did not apply 
because Landowner’s deed clearly expressed a different intention. And in 
rejecting the second argument, the court held that the evidence failed to 
demonstrate hostile use and was vague as to duration, scope, and location of 
claimed uses. The trial court’s conclusion that Landowner failed to show “a 
claim of right to the disputed property for a period of fifteen years” was not 
clearly erroneous. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. This 
decision was reached by a three-justice panel of the court, and therefore is 




Bowers v. Dunn, 198 Wash. App. 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).  
 
Homeowner appealed trial court order restricting contact between it and its 
Neighbors and establishing the parties’ rights and responsibilities regarding 
maintenance of a private road on the parties’ property. Appellate court held 
that trial court erred in issuing its order for two reasons. First, the court did 
not have statutory authority to issue injunctive relief under state law. 
Second, although the trial court had equitable authority to issue injunctive 
relief, an injunction was not the appropriate remedy as the Neighbors had 
adequate remedy available under the State’s anti-harassment provisions. 
Further, appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying certain 
provisions of the road maintenance order to non-parties. Accordingly, the 
appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to trial court 
with instruction to (1) vacate no-contact order and (2) modify the road 
maintenance order. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; 










AllEnergy Corp. v. Trempealeau County Env’t & Land Use Comm., 2017 
WI 52, 375 Wis. 2d 329, 895 N.W.2d 368. 
 
Mining Company sought a permit to mine non-metallic mineral mine for 
silica to be used for fracking sand. The county committee (“Committee”) 
denied Mining Company’s permit after the Committee conducted a public 
hearing and took testimony. The court denied that Committee acted outside 
of its jurisdiction, as asserted by Mining Company, because County’s 
legislative board created Committee to conduct very specific tasks related 
to land use and the environment. Committee and each member that 
disapproved of the permit, stayed within the confines of this limited 
jurisdiction. Mining Company also incorrectly attempted to apply the state 
rules of evidence to the permit review process, and the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court found that even if the rules applied, Committee did not go against the 
clear weight of evidence to make their decision, nor did Committee rely on 
hearsay. The court refused to adopt Mining Company’s proposed standard, 
that if a permit seeker met all the required criteria, then the permit should 
be granted. Because the court did not adopt a new standard for mining 
permits and Committee properly acted within its jurisdiction based on the 
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
Traditional Generation  
First Circuit  
AES Puerto Rico, L.P. v. Trujillo-Panisse, 857 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 
A coal-fired power plant (“Power Plant”) sued Puerto Rican municipalities 
(“Municipalities”) to challenge certain ordinances that restricted Power 
Plant’s use of ash derived from coal combustion. The dispute arose when 
Power Plant delivered ash to certain municipal landfills. After Power Plant 
disposed of the ash, Municipalities responded by fining the landfills, 
sending various notices, and physically blocking entrances to the landfills. 
Power Plant argued that the ordinances violated commonwealth law 
because they prohibited activities that the Puerto Rico Environmental 
Quality Board (“EQB”) had explicitly authorized. The district court denied 
Power Plant’s motion for summary judgment and declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over the commonwealth preemption claim. The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, concluding that EQB resolutions 
and permits—which authorized beneficial use and disposal of coal 
combustion residuals like ash—preempted Municipalities’ restrictive 
ordinances. To reach its conclusion, the court of appeals relied on a recent 
Puerto Rico case that noted EQB may exercise its regulatory power in 
“expressly preempting the field” regarding use of coal combustion 
residuals. 
 
Sixth Circuit  
 
Wilmington Tr. Co. v. AEP Generating Co., 859 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 
A coal-burning power plant owners’ trustee (“Trustee”) sued power plant 
lessees (“Lessees”), raising three claims: (1) that Lessees breached a facility 
lease by imposing an impermissible lien, (2) that Lessees breached a 
participation agreement through conduct that adversely affected the 
economic useful life of the plant and (3) that Lessees breached the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. The dispute involved a complicated sale-and-
leaseback agreement and featured “several interlocking instruments” that 
sought to provide “some protection to the plant’s residual value.” The 
district court dismissed each of Trustee’s claims and entered judgment in 
favor of Lessees. Applying New York law, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further 
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proceedings. The court held that the district court misinterpreted the facility 
lease by concluding that Lessees’ commitment to install a scrubber at the 
plant after lease expiration was not an impermissible lien. Lessees made 
such commitment in a modified consent decree after numerous parties filed 
suit under the Clean Air Act; Lessees had modified certain power plants 
without installing proper pollution controls. Having reversed the first claim 
in Trustee’s favor, the court of appeals also reversed the participation 
agreement claim. But the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
good faith and fair dealing claim on the grounds that it was duplicative of 
the breach of contract claims. 
 




Ariz. Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 393 P.3d 146 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Electric Power Cooperative (“EPC”) sought tax refunds from the Arizona 
Department of Revenue (“DOR”) for use taxes EPC had paid on certain 
out-of-state purchases of coal and natural gas. After unsuccessful protests 
before DOR and the Office of Administrative Hearings, EPC appealed to 
the state tax court. The tax court sided with DOR, concluding that EPC’s 
out-of-state purchases of coal and natural gas were subject to the use tax. 
Undeterred, EPC appealed once more—this time to the state court of 
appeals. The court held that EPC’s out-of-state purchases were subject to 
the state use tax because EPC clearly “uses and consumes” coal and natural 
gas to generate electricity within the meaning of state law. Moreover, the 
court held that such purchases were not exempt from the use tax because 
EPC’s fuels “do not directly enter into or become an ingredient or 
component part of the electricity” as required by the state manufactured-
product exemption.  
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Renewable Generation  
 
D.C. Circuit   
 
Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 854 F.3d 692 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017). 
 
Wind Farm and Public Utility disputed how much—and by what means—
Public Utility was required to purchase Wind Farm’s power. Resolving the 
dispute required analysis of the parties’ power-purchase agreement (“PPA”) 
and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”). Wind Farm 
argued that the PPA required Public Utility to purchase all of Wind Farm’s 
power and to do so using dynamic transfer services. For its part, Public 
Utility argued that the PPA required purchase of Wind Farm’s power based 
on day-ahead schedules. Wind Farm filed a complaint with the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), which concluded that the 
PPA—and its PURPA regulations—required Public Utility to accept Wind 
Farm’s entire net output. But FERC denied Wind Farms specific request for 
dynamic scheduling and Wind Farm’s claims under the Federal Power Act 
(“FPA”). Both parties filed petitions for review with the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals. First, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under 
PURPA to review Public Utility’s petition. Second, the court held that 
Public Utility did not violate FPA by denying Wind Farm’s dynamic 
transfer services while providing those services to Public Utility’s own 
power-generation resources. And finally, the court held that Public Utility 
did not violate FPA by directing its transmission personnel to deny dynamic 
scheduling services to Wind Farm. 
 
Federal Claims Court 
 
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 59 (Fed. Cl. 2017).  
 
Utility Companies filed suit claiming Department of Energy (“DOE”) 
breached the contract it entered under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, by 
failing to collect and dispose of Utility Companies’ spent nuclear fuel 
(“SNF”). In one earlier cases the court awarded Utility Companies’ partial 
judgment of $42,341,604 in damages for site modification, payroll and 
materials loaders, and additional security. In another earlier cases the court 
awarded Utility Companies $5, 197,764 for cask loading costs, and 
subsequently denied Utility Companies claims for $562,020 in fuel 
characterization costs. Utility Companies moved for reconsideration for 
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denied claims. In this case, the court found Utility Companies can recover 
full award of $562,020 in fuel characterization costs because Utility 
Companies incurred fuel characterization costs in non-breach world. 
Additionally, because Utility Companies incurred fuel characterization 
costs for loading storage casks that did not require expert opinion or 
modeling of costs in non-breach world, and Utility Companies would not 
have to store SNF in casks had DOE collected and disposed of the SNF.  
 
D.C. District Court  
 
Swecker v. Midland Power Coop., No. 16-1434, 2017 WL 2189496 (D.D.C. 
May 17, 2017). 
 
Owners of a wind turbine attempted to bring action against public utility 
companies (“Utilities”) for failing to follow regulations and Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for failing to enforce the regulations. 
Owners decided to bring action in a federal district court, but failed to meet 
their burden to show the court had personal jurisdiction over Utilities. 
Though Utilities may be part of a national federation like most public 
utilities, that does not prove ample enough connection to the specific 
federal district, so the case against Utilities was dismissed. As for FERC, 
the trial court relied on United States’ Supreme Court precedent holding 
that “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should be 
presumed immune from judicial review,” and dismissed this case as well.  
 
Rate Case – Federal  
 
Ninth Circuit  
 
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 854 F.3d 1136 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
 
During an energy crisis, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) ordered governmental and non-public utilities to pay refunds, but 
that order was overthrown in an earlier case. FERC decided to calculate the 
refund deficit by investigating net sales and purchases at hourly intervals. 
Groups of public utilities (“Groups”) in the state brought claims against the 
calculation of refunds, claiming that the refunds must be calculated over the 
entire energy crisis period. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its calculations of the 
refunds, and the refunds ordered by FERC should stand.  
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Citizens Action Coal. of Indiana, Inc. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 76 N.E.3d 
144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Public Service Company (“PSO”) filed a petition for a new rate design with 
the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“IURC”) that was immediately 
challenged by several industrial organizations (“Organizations”). 
Organizations and PSO soon reached a settlement agreement, and IURC 
approved the agreement. A coalition dedicated to protecting ratepayers then 
challenged the settlement agreement due to the lack of protection for low 
income customers. The rate design did not include a low income payment 
assistance plan or the collection and reporting of its customers’ data. 
However, the trial court found the rate plan of a fixed charge plus a variable 
energy charge with different rates for large and small commercial or 
residential customers was sufficient to approve the agreement PSO and 
Organizations. The trial court also found that there was no requirement to 
create a payment plan for low income customers or to record their data. The 
appellate court found sufficient evidence to uphold these claims and 




Laclede Gas Co. v. Office of the Pub. Counsel, WD 79830, 2017 WL 
1149140 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017). 
  
The Office of Public Counsel (“OPC”), a public organization representing 
the rights of utility customers, challenged the administrative ruling of the 
state public service commission (“Commission”).  Commission held for 
natural gas and utility provider (“Provider”) on Provider’s application to 
alter its surcharges associated with the cost of infrastructure replacement. 
To successfully establish these surcharges to recover infrastructure costs, 
state statute dictates that Provider must file a petition with Commission. 
OPC challenged the petitions arguing that the requested amount included 
costs not yet incurred and that Commission unreasonably granted of the 
petition.  The court found that state law did not prevent the inclusion of 
budgeted costs in the petition for infrastructure spending, and that state law 
did not prevent updated amendments of those budgets.  As long as 
Commission had proper time to review and audit these infrastructure 
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spending proposals, the petitions and subsequent amendments and 
Commission’s approval thereof did not unreasonably violate state law. OPC 
also challenged the ruling on due process grounds, but the court found that 





HIKO Energy, LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 5 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 
2471054 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 8, 2017). 
 
State Utility Commission (“Commission”) issued a civil penalty against an 
Electricity Supplier (“Supplier”) for Supplier’s billing actions during the 
polar vortex, that exceeded the Supplier’s designated rates. Supplier 
countered that the penalty violated the Pennsylvania and United States 
Constitutions because of the excessive nature of the penalty, and that 
Commission abused its discretion in its calculation method. Supplier 
marketed energy to residents through acquisition from third-party 
generators, which Supplier then resold to consumers. Supplier solicited 
customer contracts in a number of ways, with a variable rate set in each 
contract for the first 6 months of the contract. The polar vortex caused a 
massive increase in energy prices, which drove up Supplier’s costs; 
Supplier in turn decided to raise the prices on its customers above the 
variable rate stipulated in the contract. Supplier failed to prove that the 
penalty constituted excessive punishment in violation of the state and U.S. 
Constitutions, because Supplier had a history of violation and it relied on 
settlements rather than litigation evidence to prove the proper amount. The 
constitutions only bar fines which unreasonably charged Supplier in clear 
excess of the gravity of the offense, which here did not occur. Supplier 
deliberately overcharged thousands of customers and so long as each bill 
sent to customers constituted its own violation of the contract, then 
Commission properly calculated the penalty amount. Supplier intentionally 
sought to overcharge customers to cover its own costs and regardless of the 
lack of financial hardship of the customers as a result, Supplier still violated 
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Transmission - Federal 
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
Norhill Energy LLC v. McDaniel, 517 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. App. 2017).  
 
Lessee had taken a lease with a 2-year primary term from Lessor that 
allowed the primary term to be extended if there were “drilling or 
reworking operations” conducted “in good faith.” Towards the end of the 
primary term, Lessee had drilled six non-producing wells, and was planning 
on drilling a seventh, but Lessor convinced Lessee to try and use a 
submersible pump to remedy the water production, saying he would 
consider it “reworking” under the lease. Lessee installed the pump, but no 
oil was produced. One month after the original expiration date of the lease, 
which was still held by the “reworking” operation of the pump, Lessor and 
Lessee executed a new agreement that that Lessee would assign the lease 
back to Lessor for $50,000 within thirty days of executing the agreement. 
Lessee waited several months, but never received the $50,000 and when 
Lessee met with Lessor, Lessor made a statement to the point of he was 
trying to get out of the agreement. Lessee sued Lessor for breach of 
contract, fraud, money had and received, and promissory estoppel. The jury 
found for Lessee on all but the fraud account, but granted Lessee damages 
of $50,000 only on the money had and received account. Both parties 
motioned for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court 
granted in favor of the Lessor such that Lessee received no damages. 
Lessee appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the jury verdict, holding 
Lessee should receive the $50,000 on the money had and received account 
but not on the breach of contract claim.   
 




City of Coldwater v. Consumers Energy Co., 895 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. 
2017).  
 
This is a consolidated case of two similar cases from lower courts. In both 
cases the ownership of property changed hands and there was a break in the 
electric service between the original owners and New Owners. Also in both 
cases, New Owners switched electric service from Utility Company to City. 
Utility Company filed suit arguing under state law that it had the right to 
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provide service not the local City because it had been the first to provide 
electricity to the consumer, which it defined as the property itself. The trial 
courts found that the definition of consumer was not the property but the 
actual owner of the property, and therefore as there was a break in the 
electric service before New Owners turned electricity on, they could use 
City as the electric provider instead of Utility Company. Utility Company 
appealed, and both the appellate court and the Supreme Court of Michigan 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 




In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., 160 A.3d 484 
(Del. Ch. 2017). 
 
Shareholders of a Mining Company brought a direct and derivative suit 
against Mining Company’s Directors (“Directors”) on claims of a breach of 
their fiduciary duties following a fatal mine explosion. Shareholders alleged 
that Directors conducted business in a deliberate and systematic way as to 
avoid safety regulations, leading to the mine explosion. Investigations 
showed that those in charge of Mining Company willfully violated state and 
federal safety regulations, and a few of Mining Company’s executives 
received criminal convictions because of the mine explosion. Mining 
Company then went through a merger in which it became a subsidiary of 
Successor Company (“Successor”). Shareholders approved the merger, and 
following several stays on various actions, the merger became finalized. 
Directors moved to dismiss the claims arguing: (1) Shareholders lost 
standing following the merger, (2) the suit did not fit into one of the 
exceptions and (3) the Shareholders failed to convert their derivative claim 
into a class action claim. The two exceptions for the lack of standing would 
have required (1) the merger itself be subject to a fraud claim, perpetuated 
with the purpose to deprive shareholders of the derivative claim, or (2) the 
merger only reorganizes the existing organization. The court found neither 
of the exceptions apply to Shareholders suit, and so Successor properly 
owns the rights of Shareholders litigation because of Shareholder approval 
of the merger.  
 




In re Deepwater Horizon, 858 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 
After a settlement agreement to those damaged by a large oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico (“Claimants”), the federal district court approved multiple 
methods of calculating compensation by the Claims Administrator. Annual 
Variable Margin Methodology (“AVMM”) and Industry-Specific 
Methodologies (“ISM”) were both used to calculate compensation. 
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Claimants challenged the methods of calculation. The settlement agreement 
is ambiguous in aspects but is clear that the claimant be allowed to choose a 
time period within limits from which to calculate compensation. AVMM 
allows this choice by Claimants, but ISM allows the Claim Administrator to 
pick funds outside of the designated period. Because of the limitations of 
the time period, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Claimants were 
subject to AVMM, and that ISM did not fall within the plain meaning of the 
settlement agreement.  
 
Neiman v. Bulmahn, 854 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2017).  
 
Shareholders sued former Operating Company’s Executives (“Executives”) 
for fraud claiming Executives has scienter of the poor economic and cash 
situation of the Operating Company prior to its bankruptcy as evident by its 
misrepresentation of: (1) production from a new well, (2) available funds to 
complete a pipeline project and (3) why a newly hired CEO stepped down 
before even signing an employment agreement. The district court dismissed 
the case with prejudice, and Shareholders appealed. The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the district court stating that Shareholders failed to 
adequately plead facts to support their three claims.  
 
Tenth Circuit  
 
Energy W. Mining Co. v. Estate of Blackburn, 857 F.3d 817 (10th Cir. 
2017). 
 
Coal Miner worked in a coal mine for years. In addition to breathing the 
dust from a coal mine, he smoked cigarettes for a large part of his life. 
Later, Coal Miner became disabled from a lung disease, emphysema. Coal 
Miner filed for statutory benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act 
(“Act”). The Act provides statutory benefits to miners who can no longer 
work due to lung disorders’ caused by their employment. There is a 
rebuttable presumption that the disease is caused by the coal mining, and 
Coal Miner’s employer fought to rebut the presumption. Two of three 
doctors said that the emphysema was caused by his smoking, not the coal 
mine. The third doctor said that the disease was caused by Coal Miner’s 
time in the mine. Ultimately the ALJ ruled in favor of Coal Miner, finding 
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Gaedeke Holdings VII LTD v. Baker, Nos. 16-6004 & 16-6017, 2017 WL 
1173608 (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 2017). 
 
Interest Holder sued Developer for misappropriation of trade secrets in the 
development of oil and gas interests, among other claims. Interest Holder 
moved for a new trial following a positive ruling, and subsequently 
appealed the lower verdict award. Developer alleged that Interest Holder 
lacked standing to assert the misappropriation claim. Under Oklahoma’s 
trade secrets statute, Interest Holder possessed standing to sue under this 
claim, even though other parties also possessed standing. Oklahoma 
specifically took out the portion of the statute that required that complainant 
have ownership of the trade secrets.  Because Interest Holder need not 
prove ownership of the trade secrets, but merely show an interest therein, 
Interest Holder properly possessed standing under Oklahoma law. Interest 
Holder, however, could not appeal the second lower verdict, as parties 
cannot pick and choose the most favorable verdict in their favor. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the opinion as precedent.   
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
AquAlliance v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 856 F.3d 101 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017). 
 
Water Conservation Group (“Group”) petitioned the Bureau of Reclamation 
(“Bureau”) to turn over all records of water transfers across northern 
California pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. Litigation 
eventually prompted Bureau to turn over requested information, but Bureau 
redacted water well information. Bureau argued that the water well 
information fell into a specific exception to the request under federal law. 
The exemption allowed for Bureau to withhold “geological and geophysical 
data.” Group asserted that water wells do not fall into the category of the 
exemption. The court found that well depth and location, the information 
redacted, necessarily reveals geological and geophysical data. The court 
held the unambiguous language of the exemption under federal law applied 
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S.D. New York  
 
Harry v. Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc., No. 15-CV-9689 (JGK), 2017 
WL 1134851 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017).  
 
Buyers and sellers (collectively, “Class”) with physical natural gas and 
derivative financial natural gas contracts filed a putative class action against 
Traders, alleging monopolization and manipulation of natural gas contracts, 
and on the commodity futures and options markets. Class sued alleging 
violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), the Sherman Act, and 
the Clayton Act. Traders moved to dismiss suit. The trial court held that the 
complaint failed to sufficiently allege economic injury because of the 
alleged manipulation of monthly index prices of physical natural gas at 
regional hubs required for statutory standing to bring class action claims. 
The court reached this decision even though allegations included that 
Traders manipulated monthly index settlement prices of natural gas at four 
regional hubs because the complaint failed to allege specific transactions 
made at a fifth hub, where Class’ transactions transpired, had any direct 
connection to the monthly index prices at the other four hubs. Alternatively, 
had statutory standing existed, motion remained appropriate because the 
complaint failed to state class action for manipulation under CEA. Further, 
the complaint failed to sufficiently allege antitrust injury required for 
Sherman Act monopolization claim. The complaint failed to allege that 
Class were participants in the same market directly restrained by Traders’ 
misconduct. Finally, Class was not efficient enforcer of antitrust laws 
required for standing of a putative class action under Sherman Act since it 
was indirectly related to the primary violation asserted, and its alleged 
damages are at most speculative.   
 




Hardesty v. State Mining & Geology Bd., 219 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
 
Surface Miners (“Miners”) sued to challenge findings of the state Mining 
and Geology Board (“Board”). Board effectively denied Miners a 
“grandfather exemption” from the mining permit requirement under the 
state’s Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (“SMRA”). SMRA required 
all surface miners to obtain “an approved reclamation plan and approved 
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financial assurances to implement the plan.” The state legislature included 
in SMRA a grandfather provision to avoid takings claims from “miners 
[who] had extant private property rights” upon SMRA’s passage. The trial 
court denied Miners’ petition for writ of mandamus, and Miners timely 
appealed to the state court of appeals. Miners argued that Board and the 
trial court failed to recognize the legal force of Miners’ nineteenth-century 
federal mining patents; they argued that such patents “establish a vested 
right to surface mine” after the SMRA’s passage. But the court of appeals 
concluded that a federal mining patent “has no effect on the application of a 
state regulation of mining.” In short, the fact that Miners worked mines on 
the property “years ago” did not guarantee that surface mining existed when 
the Act took effect—a requirement for the grandfathering of surface mining 




Vekic v. Popich, 2016-0508 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/29/17); 215 So.3d 483. 
 
Owner of oyster property sued for a sublease agreement with Buyer for 
damaged incurred by the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Before the oil 
spill and settlement involving the property, Owner gave a sublease with the 
option to purchase the property exercisable with notice in writing at any 
time before the end of the lease. When the settlement was reached, both 
Owner and Buyer registered as recipients for damages to the property, and 
subsequently sued for the proceeds. The trial court found that the parties’ 
intent was to give Buyer title, and then Buyer would receive the rights to 
any settlement proceeds or future damage protection. However, the 
appellate court held that the language of the sublease agreement was a 
normal lease with the option to purchase that was not exercised. Because 
Buyer did not meet the requirements to buy the property, he was not the 
leaseholder of record on the day of the oil spill, and the sublease agreement 
did not specify anything involving settlement claims, thus Buyer is not 
entitled to any settlement proceeds. Accordingly, the appellate court 









Smith ex rel. Smith Butz, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 1431 C.D. 2016, 
2017 WL 1833472 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 8, 2017). 
 
A company (“Requester”) appealed the decisions of State Records Office’s 
(“Office”) determination denying Requester’s request the State 
Environmental Agency (“Agency”) for documents related to a Technology 
Company’s drilling and use of radioactive tracers under a state right-to-
know laws. Technology Company argued that the records were protected or 
exempt from the right-to-know law on various exemptions. The appellate 
court held that Agency properly denied disclosure on the basis that certain: 
(1) requested records were subject to attorney client or work project 
privilege, (2) records may jeopardize public safety if disclosed, (3) records 
contained trade secrets, (4) records constituted “working papers and notes” 
and (5) documents were still under determination by Agency. The appellate 
court held that although some documents regarding non-criminal 
investigations of Technology Company’s operations were exempt, state law 
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Ninth Circuit  
 
Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. EPA, 852 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
State, cement kiln owner, and copper smelter owner (collectively, 
“Owners”) petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for judicial review 
of EPA’s Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) promulgated under the 
Clean Air Act (“CAA”). EPA issued FIP to replace rejected portions of the 
State’s Implementation Plan (“SIP”), which listed proposals to reduce 
emission and improve air visibility in federal wilderness areas located in the 
State. However, after reviewing Owner’s petition, the court found that 
Owner’s challenges to FIP were either not ripe for review or lacked merit. 
For instance, EPA’s imposition of emissions-control technology called 
“selective non-catalytic reduction” to control cement kiln constituted valid 
agency rulemaking because EPA considered all expressed factors including 
visibility improvement, though not weighing all factors evenly. Further, 
EPA’s limit on nitrogen oxides emissions from copper smelters to improve 
air visibility in federal wilderness areas intrastate constituted valid 
rulemaking even though the emissions did not currently exceed the allowed 
limit set by the EPA. The rationale: Because smelters were best available 
retrofit technology (“BART”) eligible sources likely to emit over the 
prescribed limit, and BART determination centered on a source-by-source 
basis rather than pollutant-by-pollutant. EPA’s limit on particulate matter 
emissions from copper smelter constituted valid agency rulemaking. 
Although EPA determined no additional controls could reduce emissions of 
particulate matter, EPA had an obligation to set emission limits for each 
source subject to BART. Finally, EPA’s limit on sulfur dioxide emissions 
from copper smelter constituted valid rulemaking because EPA relied on 
smelter’s own representation of control efficiency rate when imposing limit 
from smelter data that showed such limit was feasible to achieve. EPA also 
articulated its rationale for its findings.  
 
Defs. of Wildlife v. Zinke, 856 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
Wildlife Protection Group (“Group”) challenged the issuance of a permit by 
various Federal Agencies (“Agencies”) in connection with a right-of-way 
associated with a solar energy project (“Project”). Group argued that the 
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Project threatened the well-being of a desert tortoise and the decisions to 
grant the permit arbitrarily and capriciously violated the terms of federal 
law. Group argued that Agencies improperly relied on the remedial 
measures of the project, and that the threat to the tortoise far outweighed 
any value of remedial measures. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals determined that Agencies relied more on the lack of a measurable 
threat to the tortoise, so the inclusion of remedial measures by Agencies 
was not arbitrary or capricious. The court additionally rejected Group’s 
challenge against the project’s placement in proximity to the critical area 
might affect the tortoise because the placement would not actual reduce the 
critical area, but the land that connects two critical areas. The court finally 
rejected the arguments that Agencies requirements for initiation of further 
reviews of the project violated federal law. Group failed to prove that any 
of the actions of the Agencies rose to the level of arbitrary or capricious to 
warrant an injunction against the project.   
 
In re Big Thorne Project, 857 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 
The United States Forest Service (“USFS”) approved a logging and road 
building project (“Project”) in southeast Alaska. Environmental Groups 
sued USFS attempting to derail the Project and protect the territory of 
specific type of wolf. The district court granted summary judgment for 
USFS, and Environmental Groups appealed arguing that USFS violated the 
National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) in approving the Project 
because USFS did not make sure that, even with the Project, the forest 
could support a sustainable or even viable wolf population. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, holding that under 
NFMA, USFS need only provide where possible a sustainable wolf 
population, which provides USFS flexibility to balance competing uses of 
the land. And as USFS balance in favor of jobs and the economy was 
reasonable, especially as the forest did not already support a sustainable 
wolf population, the court has no authority to overturn USFS’s decision.  
 
D.C. Circuit  
 
Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 
Environmental Group sought review of the rule issued by EPA regarding an 
exception to two federal statutes regarding the requirement to report the 
release of large amounts of hazardous material. EPA rule exempted farmers 
from the reporting requirement specifically related to the air release of 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
638 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
animal waste. EPA then walked the exemption back and required that large 
animal feeding operations, with hundreds or thousands of animals in 
concentrated areas, still report large air releases of waste. Environmental 
Group challenged EPA’s ability to issue this rule, specifically arguing that 
the rule extended beyond the de minimis power of EPA to create similar 
ruling. Environmental Group argued that this rule amounted to an alteration 
of the federal statutes, a power which EPA does not possess. Rather than 
interpreting a particular area of the statute, as allowed under agency law, 
the final rule sets forth unrelated exemptions under the law, exemptions not 
prescribed anywhere in the law. Additionally, the exemptions would 
deprive Environmental Group, and others, of public information regarding 
pollution releases, one of the explicit goals of the federal laws. Because 
Environmental Group suffered an injury in fact and the rule goes beyond 
the power of EPA, the appellate court vacated the rule.  
 
D. Idaho  
 
Friends of Clearwater v. Probert, No. 3:16–cv–00485–REB, 2017 WL 
2367048 (D. Idaho May 31, 2017). 
 
Environmental Group (“Group”) sought to enjoin a proposed Wildfire 
Protection Project (“Project”), arguing that the Project’s activities would 
cause “irreparable harm to potential wilderness values” in the area. Project 
would involve removing numerous trees and building a road to enhance 
public safety and protect homes and other structures from wildfires. 
Ultimately, the district court denied Group’s motion for preliminary 
injunction of Project. The court stated that although the nature of Project’s 
activities would impact the area’s natural landscape, Project’s purpose was 
“critical” to the community and safety of persons using and living nearby 
that region’s national forest. Moreover, there was evidence that the Forest 
Service’s approval of Project complied with relevant environmental laws, 
including the National Environmental Policy Act. Thus, based on the 
present record, Group did not have a likelihood of success on the merits of 
its claims as required for issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court 
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S.D. West Virginia  
 
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Pruitt, No. 3:15-0271, 2017 WL 1712527 
(S.D. W.Va. May 2, 2017). 
 
Environmental Groups challenged EPA’s failure to regulate and enforce 
federal water standards law on an uncompliant state. The state did not adopt 
standards for its waterways, as required by federal law, and in turn, EPA 
did not follow the law by imposing its own standards for the state’s 
waterways when the noncompliance became apparent. The lower court 
granted Environmental Groups’ motion to force EPA to adopt standards for 
the state in compliance with federal law. EPA in turn sought a stay of the 
order pending appeal. To successfully receive the stay, EPA needed to 
show that: (1) a likelihood of success on appeal, (2) that EPA would be 
irreparably harmed without the stay, (3) lack of the stay will irreparably 
injure the interested parties and (4) the public interest favors a stay. EPA 
failed to prove all four points, and so the court denied its stay pending 
appeal.  
 
W.D. Oklahoma  
 
Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC, CIV-16-134-F, 2017 WL 
1287546 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 4, 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization sought to enjoin an oil and gas operator 
(“Operator”) from activities regarding waste water injection relating to 
seismicity. Organization alleged that Operator’s actions violated numerous 
federal laws and increased the likelihood of earthquakes in the region. At 
the same time, the state regulatory agency reviewed the same issues 
regarding injection relating to seismicity. Operator moved to dismiss, 
claiming that the district court should abstain from ruling on a matter to be 
properly decided by the state regulatory agency. The court found that, as 
Organization only sought equitable remedies, the state regulatory agency’s 
review board constituted the proper avenue for Organization to seek relief. 
Because the state regulatory agency already had ongoing review of this 
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Aptos Council v. City of Santa Cruz, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2017).  
 
Community council (“Council”) challenged a County’s adoption of three 
ordinances under the State Environmental Quality Act (“SEQA”), claiming 
that County’s adoption resulted from an improper piecemeal review of 
environmental impacts. Council claimed that County should have 
considered the ordinances as a single project under the SEQA because 
County’s goal was to reform and modernize zoning regulations. The 
appellate court addressed the issue whether County’s passage of the three 
ordinances constitute a single project under the SEQA, and whether County 
violated SEQA by not considering environmental impact reports. County’s 
ordinances authorized: (1) administrative approval of minor exceptions to 
zoning site standards, (2) administrative approvals of sign exceptions with a 
public notice and (3) denser hotel developments. The court found each 
ordinance to be three separate projects. According to the court, SEQA 
requires an environmental impact report for projects if their effects are 
“reasonably foreseeable consequence.” Here, the court emphasized 
“consequence” and found that although the ordinances shared the common 
objective of modernizing zoning regulations, because the regulatory 
reforms operated independently of each other and because County could 
implement each regulation separately, there was no SEQA violation.  
 
Assoc. of Irritated Residents v. Dep’t of Conservation, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Interest groups (“Groups”) challenged the California Department of 
Conservation, Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources (“DOGGR”) 
after it issued permits to 214 new hydraulic fracturing oil wells in one 
county. Groups claimed that the permitting of all wells was done without 
any environmental review and in violation of the California Environmental 
Quality Act (“CEQA”). DOGGR argued that the case was barred due to a 
final judgment in a prior action in another county. Groups claimed that the 
case was not barred because the prior action was dismissed due to the 
enacting of a new law making the case moot. The appellate court held in 
favor for Groups, finding that the CEQA applies, meaning this case is not 
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moot. The court sent the case back down to trial court for further 
proceedings.  
 
Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach, 392 P.3d 455 (Cal. 
2017). 
 
City approved the development of a large parcel of land and performed an 
environmental impact report (“EIR”). Conservation Group took legal action 
to set aside the approval of the development arguing the EIR was 
inadequate and City did not work with the California Coastal Commission 
(“Commission”) to identify wetlands and habitats affected by the 
development. In California, the EIR must follow the guidelines of the 
California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), which requires an EIR 
for areas which may qualify as environmentally sensitive habitat areas 
under state law. The trial court found for Conservation Group because 
environmentally sensitive habitats must be identified before approval of a 
development project requiring Commission being consulted before the EIR 
and before approval. The appellate court reversed. The California Supreme 
Court then held that CEQA requires that an EIR must identify 
environmentally sensitive areas, or areas that might be identified as such, 
and City’s EIR is inadequate due to its lack of cooperation with 
Commission to identify the correct areas. 
 
Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
The California Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”) brought suit against 
the California State Air Resources Board (“Board”) over its implementing 
regulation setting a “cap-and-trade” on the right to emit greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”). The California legislature passed, by a simple majority, the 
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (“Act”), which granted 
Board regulatory authority over emissions. Board set up a program where 
companies could purchase “compliance instruments” that would allow them 
to emit certain GHGs. These emission allowances were sold at quarterly 
auctions by Board. This stifled business operations, so Chamber sued, 
seeking to invalidate this regulation. The first assertion was that Board’s 
decision to sell these emission allowances at an auction exceeded the 
authority granted to Board by California’s Legislature. The court disagreed 
with this assertion, finding Board held ample authority to conduct the 
auctions. The second assertion by Chamber was that the Act imposes a tax 
on the companies having to purchase the emission allowances, and, as per 
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the California constitution, the imposition of this tax requires a two-thirds 
supermajority vote in the legislature. The court also disagreed with this 
assertion as a tax is: (1) compulsory for the payee and (2) something for 
which the payee receives nothing in return. Board’s auction is voluntary 
and is a sale of something of value. For these reasons, Board’s regulation 
was not found to be a tax and was upheld. 
 
POET, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2017). 
 
State Air Quality Board (“Board”), in charge of the state plan to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, sought to comply with an earlier court order 
related to low carbon fuel standards (“Standards”). A Biofuel Company 
challenged Board’s finding that certain emissions disqualified Biofuel 
Company to receive state environmental credits, and that such emission 
standards violated state law. The court previously ordered Board to correct 
such standards. Board improperly used an antiquated baseline for the 
emissions of greenhouse gasses related to biofuels which deprived the 
public of vital information, in violation of state environmental law. To 
facilitate Board to remedy its deficiencies, the court ordered that the 
regulations remain frozen so that Board need not hit a moving target. 
Finally, the court found that Board made a bad faith selection as to its 
baseline standards for the biofuel emissions.  
 
Sierra Club v. Cty. of Sonoma, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Environmental Group challenged the City Commissioner’s 
(“Commissioner”) determination that the issuance of a permit for a 
vineyard was a ministerial act, which exempted the decision from state 
environmental law. County ordinance required vineyard operators to obtain 
an erosion control permit from Commissioner prior to commencement of 
operation. Operators, also a party in interest with Commissioner, submitted 
their permit, and after several alternations to the plans, Commissioner 
approved the permit. Later, Commissioner labeled the issuance as 
ministerial and exempted from state law. The ministerial exemption only 
covers decisions regarding projects that does not require Commissioner’s 
discretion. A project lacks discretion if Commissioner would lack the 
power to stop it regardless of further environmental review under the state 
law. Environmental Group argued that the issuance of the permit always 
requires Commissioner discretion and thus the ministerial exemption should 
never apply. Environmental Group cited many state provisions that created 
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discretion, but the court summarily rejected the application of these 
provisions to this type of erosion control permit. Finally, Environmental 
Group argued that because Commissioner may request additional actions be 
taken, this stripped the decision of its ministerial label. The court found that 
the ability to request additional information does not rise to the level as to 
forgo the ministerial status, and therefore approved the permit. The court 
limited its opinion only to Operator’s permit, and did not extend its decision 




Clean Harbors, Inc. v. Union Pac. Corp., C.A. No. N15C-07-081 MMJ 
CCLD, 2017 WL 1175664 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017). 
  
The dispute arose between a hazardous waste facility operator (“Operator”) 
and the Operator’s Predecessor-in-Interest (“Predecessor”) regarding an 
indemnity clause in a stock purchase agreement (“SPA”). Predecessor 
agreed to indemnity Operator for certain environmental liabilities up to a 
certain dollar amount, and for a certain period from the effective date of the 
SPA. EPA and state environmental agency investigated contamination on 
the facility property and required Operator to remediate the contamination 
damages. Operator took necessary steps to clean up the contamination in a 
timely manner and submitted claim for costs of remediation to Predecessor 
pursuant to the SPA. The claim hinged on whether EPA and state agency 
were third parties to the contamination claims, a necessary requirement to 
trigger the indemnity. On summary judgment, the court found that EPA and 
the state agency met the third-party requirement, but issues of fact still 
existed regarding the extent of the remediation claim and the actual dollar 
figure that Predecessor must indemnify. The court also found for 
Predecessor and dismissed Operator’s claim for lost profits and excluded 
Operator’s expert witness. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 




Borcik v. Crosby Tugs, L.L.C., 2016-1372 (La. 5/3/17), No. 2016-QC-1372, 
2017 WL 1716226. 
 
A federal circuit court certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court 
to determine the definition of “good faith” in reference to a state 
environmental quality statute. The law protects employees who identify or 
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complain of an environmental violation, so long as the employee does so in 
good faith and with the reasonable belief that the violation occurred. At trial 
in the federal court system, a tug boat operator (“Employer”) fired 
Employee after Employee claimed that his superiors ordered him to dump 
waste oil into navigable waters. Employer claimed that the firing occurred 
because of insubordination. The court found that a broader definition of 
good faith more adequately captured the goals of the environmental 
protection law, to encourage employees to identify environmental 
violations. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the definition 
that “good faith” means that the employee acted with an honest belief that a 
violation of a law occurred.   
 
New Jersey  
 
In re Final Surface Water Renewal Permit Action NJPDES Permit No. 
NJ0102563, No. A-5803-13T1, 2017 WL 1550009 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. May 1, 2017). 
 
Environmental Groups challenged the issuance of a permit to the Waste 
Treatment Corporation (“Corporation”) on the claims that the permit 
violates state environmental laws. Corporation sought the permit to 
discharge treated waste water into a river. Environmental Groups allege that 
the permit did not receive proper review and the prolonged procedure, 
which stretched back close to a decade, should prohibit the issuance of a 
permit. Corporation claims that its permit process complied with all the 
applicable review procedures. A state law required that Corporation discuss 
plans and receive approval from a regional commission on the permitted 
plans. The court found that, although Corporation produced evidence of 
telephonic communication between Corporation and the regional 
commission, no proof existed of approval, or what was discussed. 
Therefore, the court remanded the permit back to the administrative level. 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
New York  
 
In re Zahav Enters., Inc. v. Martens, 53 N.Y.S.3d 679 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2017).  
 
Landowner, owned and operated a gas station up until 2007, when it sold 
the land to third party to be used as a pharmacy. Per state law, Landowner 
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was responsible for environmental clean-up associated with the land and the 
removal of the underground storage tanks. When the storage tanks were 
removed petroleum contamination was found and reported to the New York 
State Department of Conservation (“DEC”). After a year of back and forth 
between DEC and Landowner on how to clean up the contamination, DEC 
sent Landowner a final notice letter requiring it to have a plan for dealing 
with the contamination by November 2010. Landowner did not respond or 
submit a plan, so DEC moved for the regulatory commission 
(“Commission”) to issue an order citing Landowner for three different 
violations and fine Landowner $112,500. Commission ultimately cited 
Landowner for the three violations, but decreased the fine to $60,000. 
Landowner then commenced a proceeding against DEC for acting in bad 
faith and one of its employees for violating state law. The appellate court 
found that the Landowner’s contentions were without merit, that the 
stipulation was valid.  
 
Town of Marilla v. Travis, No. 151 A.D. 3d 1588 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 
Town challenged the State Environmental Agency’s (“Agency”) decision to 
grant a waste treatment storage facility to Facility Operator. Facility 
Operator sought a permit to store treated waste water in containers to be 
held until the waste water could be used as fertilizer. Agency appointed 
itself as the proper review agency after Town failed to create a review 
process. The court found that Town improperly argued that Agency did not 
follow proper procedure. Agency properly reviewed scientific and 
engineering data in compliance with all statutes to make its permit decision. 
Facility Operator complied with each Agency request for additional 
information or tests. Under state law, if the court finds that Agency properly 
followed all relevant procedure, then the court will not substitute its 
decisions for that of the Agency. Because Agency followed procedural and 
the permit grant did not violate the clear evidence, Agency properly granted 
the storage permit.  
 
North Carolina  
 
WASCO LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res., 799 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
 
This dispute involved a cleanup site (“Site”) that various parties once used 
to operate a textile business. Beneath the Site were storage tanks containing 
hazardous dry-cleaning solvents, which had leaked. Pursuant to the federal 
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and state Hazardous 
Waste Program (“HWP”), agencies sought to hold entities responsible for 
cleanup of the Site. Meanwhile, former manufacturer (“Company”) 
provided financial assurances to the state Division of Waste Management 
(“DWM”) and was actively involved in the Site’s post-closure 
environmental issues. After DWM declared that Company was liable as an 
“operator” of the Site, Company sought a declaration from an ALJ that it 
was not an operator under relevant laws. The ALJ disagreed and granted 
summary judgment for DWM. Company sought review in the trial court, 
which affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. The court concluded that Company was 
“an operator of a landfill” for purposes of HWP. Company appealed to the 
court of appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that 
the trial court properly sought guidance from federal law—including the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act—in assessing whether Company was an operator under HWP. 
Moreover, the court held that HWP’s definition “includes those parties in 
charge of directing post-closure activities” under RCRA. Finally, the court 
concluded that the facts on which the trial court relied insisted that 




Nat’l Fuel Gas Midstream Corp. v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 116 C.D. 
2016, 2017 WL 2391719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 2, 2017). 
 
This case addressed whether a state Department of Environmental 
Protection (“DEP”) may, for air pollution control purposes, aggregate two 
facilities owned by separate entities that ultimately derive from a common 
company when one of the entities is exempt from permitting requirements. 
A well-pad operator (“WPO”) and compressor-station operator (“CSO”) 
were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Parent Company; WPO was exempt 
from the permitting requirements at issue. The permitting requirements 
stemmed from the federal Clean Air Act and state Air Pollution Control 
Act. Under those statutes, DEP may aggregate two related natural gas 
operations into a single source for permitting purposes; various standards 
bear on whether two facilities amount to a single source. This case focused 
on the third prong of DEP’s three-part test: whether the facilities are “under 
common control.” Although DEP and the Environmental Hearing Board 
(“EHB”) construed “common control” in different ways, both concluded 
that WPO and CSO were a single source for permitting purposes. WPO and 
CSO raised three arguments on appeal: (1) that EHB misconstrued the 
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common-control test; (2) that EHB could not impose obligations on WPO 
as an exempt party; and (3) that EHB’s conclusion that WPO and CSO fell 
within the “common sense notion of a plant” was arbitrary and capricious. 
First, the court held that EHB’s “power to influence” standard for common 
control was too lax; in the court’s view, the proper test was “ability to 
direct.” Second, the court held that to aggregate an exempt facility, DEP 
must show either the Parent Company’s direct involvement in operations or 
pierce the corporate veil. And finally, the court remanded the “notion of a 
plant” issue in view of the fact that EHB applied the wrong standard for 
“common control.” 
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